Determinants of Illinois farmland prices by Hanson, Erik
  
 
 
DETERMINANTS OF ILLINOIS FARMLAND PRICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
ERIK DREVLOW HANSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
Master’s Committee:  
 
Professor Bruce Sherrick, Chair 
 Professor Gary Schnitkey  
Assistant Professor Nicholas Paulson  
 
 
 
 
 ii  
	  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the determinants of Illinois farmland prices.  Hedonic models are 
utilized to represent and analyze the defining characteristics of Illinois farmland.  Models are 
applied to Illinois Department of Revenue farmland transfer data from 1979 to 2010.  Particular 
attention is given to farmland prices from 2000 to 2010.  Results show that urban influence was 
an exceptionally important determinant of county-level farmland prices during the early 2000s.  
Soil productivity was also a major driver of farmland price variation.  Parcel-level regressions 
confirm these insights.  This study’s findings agree with anecdotal and empirical evidence from 
the Illinois farmland market in recent years. 
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CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION 
 
Farmland prices have soared in recent years.  United States farmland prices more than 
doubled during the first decade of the twenty-first century (USDA).  Farmland prices in Illinois 
experienced even greater growth in this period.  In fact, Illinois farmland prices increased nearly 
80 percent during the 2004 to 2008 period alone.  Farmland amounts to roughly 85 percent of 
farm assets, making it undeniably important to farmers and their balance sheets (USDA).1  
However, curiosity about farmland prices is not limited to farmers.  Whether they view 
skyrocketing farmland prices as a profit opportunity or a burgeoning crisis, financial institutions, 
individual investors, and policy makers are all interested in farmland markets.  For these 
stakeholders, the startling climb of farmland prices motivates numerous questions regarding the 
determinants of farmland prices and how these determinants may have recently changed.   
It is crucial to investigate the interplay between agricultural and nonagricultural 
influences on farmland prices.  Lately, agricultural returns to farmland have been strong.  That 
said, transitional farmland experienced price appreciation greater than any other farmland class 
during the early 2000s, suggesting that nonagricultural factors also play a key role in farmland 
price determination.  Furthermore, anecdotal evidence sparks curiosity about the impact of strong 
recreational demand on recent Illinois farmland prices.  Each of these explanations of high 
farmland prices is explored herein.  In short, this study analyzes the fundamental determinants of 
Illinois farmland prices with a particular focus on the farmland market from 2000 to 2010. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Illinois’ ratio of farmland value to total farm assets is historically above the national average (see Figure 2.3). 
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1.1  Purpose and Contribution 
Farmland prices are a topic of enduring interest within agricultural economics.  Although 
research on farmland prices never truly ceases, it is particularly common when farmland markets 
are characterized by historic highs, lows, or volatility.  In today’s era of record farmland prices, 
farmland price research has reemerged as an exceptionally relevant subject.  Nevertheless, 
academic literature on this period is still in its formative stages.  As home to some of the nation’s 
most productive and valuable farmland, the Illinois farmland market represents a tremendous 
case study.  Like farmland prices across the nation, Illinois farmland prices have recently been 
pushed upward by strong farm incomes, developmental pressures, and recreational demand.  
These subtopics are discussed at length in subsequent chapters.  The detailed background 
information and empirical results in this study offer insights into Illinois farmland market 
dynamics. 
This study utilizes farm real estate transfer data from the Illinois Department of Revenue 
(IDOR).  The IDOR data set is uniquely rich because it includes all farmland sales in the state 
and contains transaction-specific financial details for each of these sales.  Moreover, unlike many 
other data sources that rely on self-reported estimates of market value, the IDOR data set 
provides accurate, market-based prices.  Other studies of the IDOR data set are conducted by 
Chicoine (1981), Oltmans et al. (1988), and Huang et al. (2006).  None of these analyses use 
IDOR data from 2000 or beyond.  Because farmland prices have become increasingly 
newsworthy of late, a two-fold opportunity exists to answer questions about recent farmland 
market trends and renew scholarship using the IDOR data set.  This research aims to capitalize 
on this opportunity by focusing on IDOR data from 2000 to 2010. 
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 Another noteworthy element of this research is its theoretical framework.  Like many 
other real estate price analyses, this study uses a hedonic model to evaluate the importance of 
various parcel characteristics.  The empirical model used in this study also accounts for spatial 
relationships between county-level farm prices in Illinois.  In fact, the parsimonious specification 
and spatial considerations of this study’s model combine elements of the two most prominent 
recent studies of the IDOR data set (Oltmans, et al., 1988; Huang et al., 2006).  These 
characteristics forge a model designed to yield practical, meaningful results. 
 The hedonic model used in this study explains Illinois farmland prices well in both the 
1979 to 2010 and 2000 to 2010 periods.  Regression results show that the deterministic influence 
of population pressure on farmland prices was historically high during the 2000 to 2010 period.  
However, this influence was dampened in the last five years of the period.  These temporal 
trends correspond with the rise and fall of transitional farmland sales, which were a major 
portion of farmland sales near urban areas.  Results also indicate that the deterministic impact of 
soil productivity, which was somewhat low during the 2000 to 2005 period, increased during the 
2006 to 2010 period.  The increased importance of soil productivity may reflect strengthening 
commodity prices and farm incomes from 2006 to 2010.  These county-level findings are 
complimented by parcel-level models that offer a fresh perspective on Illinois farmland price 
determination.  The results of parcel-level regressions demonstrate that agricultural 
productivity’s influence on farmland prices is considerable, providing strong proof of the well-
known connection between agricultural returns and farmland prices.  In summary, empirical 
results justify this study’s hedonic model and offer a reasonable, insightful description of recent 
Illinois farmland prices. 
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1.2  Overview 
This study is divided into six chapters.  Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
provides a narrative summarizing characteristics and historical price trends of Illinois farmland.  
Particular emphasis is given to purported drivers of Illinois farmland prices from 2000 to 2010.  
Chapter 3 pays special attention to hedonic models and Illinois-specific literature while 
reviewing previous research on farmland price determination.  Chapter 4 describes the 
construction and rationale of the farmland price and explanatory variables used in this research.  
Chapter 4 also explains this study’s theoretical model, which is based on both hedonic 
methodologies and spatial considerations.  Chapter 5 provides regression results from the 
hedonic model outlined in Chapter 4 and discusses these results in detail.  Finally, Chapter 6 
summarizes this study’s results and proposes avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2    BACKGROUND 
 
2.1  Characteristics of Illinois Farmland 
The footprint of Illinois agriculture is immense in both economic and geographic terms.  
Illinois ranked sixth nationally in agricultural sales according to the most recent Census of 
Agriculture (USDA, 2009a).  Illinois’ agricultural receipts are dominated by crop sales.  Over 
the past three decades, corn and soybeans combined to average 90 percent of the state’s crop 
receipts and 67 percent of the state’s total agricultural receipts (USDA).  In 2007, Illinois ranked 
second nationally in the production of both crops.  At least 60 percent of the state’s total land in 
farms has been planted in corn or soybeans in each year since 1980.  From 2000 to the present, 
no less than 79 percent of Illinois farmland has been devoted to the state’s two preeminent crops. 
Illinois’ agricultural prominence stems from its vast supply of excellent farmland.  
Farmland encompasses approximately three-quarters of Illinois’ total land area (USDA, 2009b).  
Illinois cropland is as fertile as it is abundant.  The state contains nearly 21 million acres of 
prime farmland, which has “the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics for 
producing food, feed, forage, fiber and oilseed crops” (USDA, 2009b; USDA, 2012).  No state 
has more prime farmland relative to its total land area.  Illinois farmland’s high productivity is 
translated into high prices.  In 2010, per-acre Illinois farmland values ranked ninth in the nation 
(USDA).  However, in a more revealing comparison involving other strong agricultural states, 
Illinois farmland was more valuable than farmland in the 19 other states that devoted over 40 
percent of their land to agriculture. 
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2.2  Illinois Farmland Prices Through Time 
Illinois farmland prices have undergone considerable change during recent decades.  
Figure 2.1 displays average Illinois farmland prices from 1979 to 2010 in both nominal and real 
dollars (USDA).2  Several farmland market events from this era are of major historical 
importance.  These events provide the context for a more complete discussion of Illinois 
farmland prices.   
The first notable event in the 1979 to 2010 period was the considerable farmland price 
decline from 1981 to 1987.  Within that time frame, Illinois farmland prices declined at an 
annually compounded rate of 10.2 percent (USDA).  This steep drop followed a dramatic 
increase in farmland prices over the preceding decade.  In the ten years prior to 1981, Illinois 
farmland prices more than doubled due to a “perfect storm” of farmland price appreciation.  
Farm exports and incomes surged due to a weak dollar and massive demand from China, the 
USSR, and developing nations (Barnett, 2000).  In addition, soaring inflation cut the real cost of 
borrowing to extremely low levels and investors developed a considerable appetite for farmland 
as an anti-inflation hedge.  These events combined to push Illinois farmland prices to record 
highs in 1981.  However, gains in farmland prices were erased from 1981 to 1987 as weakened 
global demand and heightened interest rates damaged farm exports and farm income (Henderson, 
2011).  To make matters worse, the high debt levels that supported farmland price growth in the 
1970s quickly became an unmanageable burden for farmers, many of whom were forced to sell 
their land due to debt service problems.  Altogether, a multitude of factors caused farmland 
prices to plummet between 1981 and 1987.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Real farmland prices were adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  	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A long period of farmland price growth began in 1987.  From 1987 to 2003, Illinois 
farmland prices increased at an annually compounded rate of 4.8 percent.  Real farmland prices 
grew 1.7 percent annually during that span, underscoring the slow, steady climb of Illinois 
farmland prices.  In 2003, Illinois farmland prices entered a period of exceptionally rapid growth.  
Over the next five years, Illinois farmland prices increased at a staggering 14.8 percent annually, 
marking the greatest five-year surge since the height of the farmland bubble in 1981. 
For some, the upswing in farmland prices that began in 2003 is painfully reminiscent of 
the 1970s farmland boom (Henderson et al., 2011).  Similar to the 1970s, high farm incomes in 
recent years are a product of price-lifting demand shocks.  Furthermore, the opportunity cost of 
purchasing farmland has been very low since the middle of the 2000 to 2010 period, just as it 
was in the 1970s.  However, the recent era of low real interest rates is the result of low nominal 
interest rates, not the massive inflation that depressed real interest rates during the 1970s.  
Another key difference between the 1970s and today is the extent to which discounted farm 
incomes support farmland price appreciation.  As shown in Figure 2.2, imputed farmland prices 
validate the notion that current farmland prices are justified by market fundamentals while 1970s 
farmland prices were not.3  Regardless, the recent surge in farmland prices makes farm balance 
sheets increasingly vulnerable to volatility in farmland markets.  Figure 2.3 illustrates that 
farmland values’ share of farm assets has spiked lately, recalling a similar run-up that preceded 
the farm crisis of the 1980s.   
Although actual and imputed Illinois farmland prices follow nearly identical paths in 
recent years, this clear perspective on farmland valuation becomes clouded when more detailed 
data are considered.  In fact, the relationship between cash rents and farmland prices varies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Imputed farmland values were calculated by discounting yearly Illinois cash rents (from USDA) using average 10-
year constant maturity treasury yields from corresponding years. 
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widely within Illinois.  Calculated as a parcel’s per-acre price divided by its per-acre cash rent, 
the price-to-rent (PTR) multiple measures the interplay between agricultural income and 
farmland sale price.  Figure 2.4 displays county-average PTR multiples constructed using 
matched sale prices and cash rents from 2005 Illinois Society of Professional Farm Managers 
and Rural Appraisers (ISPFMRA) data.4  Considerable differences exist among PTR multiples 
across Illinois.  Figure 2.4 shows that the eight largest county-average PTR multiples in 2005 
were more than twice the magnitude of the ten smallest county-average PTR multiples.   
Figure 2.4 represents a key concept.  Under basic net present value theory that assumes a 
spatially-invariant discount rate, the relationship between cash rents and farmland prices should 
be uniform across space at a point in time.  The heterogeneous PTR multiples displayed in 
Figure 2.4 undercut this notion.  Furthermore, Figure 2.4 motivates a deeper conversation about 
Illinois farmland prices.  If current cash rents are not a sufficient indicator of expected income, it 
may imply that net agricultural income is expected to grow at different rates in different areas.  
Alternatively, Figure 2.4 may indicate that farmland owners base their income expectations on 
both agricultural and nonagricultural factors.  In addition, it is reasonable to wonder whether 
region-specific shocks in farmland supply or demand are responsible for the spatial heterogeneity 
in Figure 2.4.  These questions emphasize the complexities of farmland price determination and 
provide further impetus to explore the topic. 
 
2.3  Recent Trends in the Illinois Farmland Market 
Illinois farmland prices have grown at a historically high rate since the turn of the twenty-
first century.  The most basic cause of high farmland prices is the strength of Illinois’ farm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ISPFMRA data from 2005 were used for the construction of PTR multiples.  Counties without average PTR 
multiples are those for which no cash rent data were reported.  A total of 462 observations were used to construct 
average PTR multiples for the 61 counties studied. 
 9  
	  
economy.  As Figure 2.5 shows, prices for Illinois’ two main crops increased steadily from 2000 
to 2010.  In the latter part of the 2000 to 2010 period, prices for both corn and soybeans reached 
levels not consistently seen since the 1970s.  High commodity prices are due in part to strong 
demand from American ethanol producers and Chinese soybean importers.  These sources 
consume approximately one-quarter of the nation’s output of corn and soybeans, respectively 
(Gloy et al., 2011).  As displayed in Figure 2.6, profits reaped from strong commodity prices 
drove increased farm incomes and cash rents.  On a per-acre basis, Illinois net farm incomes 
grew at an annually compounded rate of 10.2 percent between 2000 and 2010.  Illinois cash rents 
increased by $50 per acre from 2000 to 2010, reflecting 3.6 percent annually compounded 
growth.  Net farm incomes and cash rents each received a noticeable boost around 2006, the year 
when commodity prices began shifting upward.  The county-level Farm Business Farm 
Management Association (FBFM) data summarized in Table 2.1 show that cash rent growth was 
particularly strong and widespread from 2006 onward.  All told, the capitalization of strong 
agricultural returns into farmland prices was a critical component of farmland price growth from 
2000 to 2010.   
Illinois farmland drew attention from both farmers and investors during the 2000 to 2010 
period.  In addition to offering an anti-inflation hedge and current income, farmland was a 
particularly attractive investment from 2000 to 2010 because of its strong performance relative to 
other assets.  Figure 2.7 illustrates that Illinois farmland delivered fairly predictable returns from 
2000 to 2010 and was highly competitive in a troubled investing climate.  Moreover, as signaled 
by low interest rates, the opportunity cost of purchasing farmland was minimal for most of the 
2000 to 2010 period.  Low financing costs spurred demand for farmland from both inside and 
outside agriculture. 
 10  
	  
High returns to Illinois farmland ownership elicited increasing demand from investors 
between 2000 and 2005.  According to ISPFMRA survey data, farmland purchases by individual 
investors climbed steadily from 33 percent of all Illinois farmland sales in 2000 to 46 percent of 
all sales in 2005 (ISPFMRA, 2001; ISPFMRA, 2006).  Heightened aggressiveness from 
investors crowded out farmers, whose share of Illinois farmland purchases dropped from 51 
percent to 41 percent between 2000 and 2005.  The farmland market dominance of investors 
disappeared as the national economy turned downward.  By 2007, 60 percent of farmland buyers 
were farmers and only 23 percent were investors (ISPFMRA, 2008).  A similar gap between 
farmer purchases and investor purchases persisted for the rest of the decade.  Although demand 
for Illinois farmland was strong throughout the state, farmland supply remained relatively tight 
from 2000 to 2010.  As Figure 2.8 shows, an estimated one to two percent of Illinois farmland 
turned over annually during this period, with turnover declining in later years.5  Table 2.2 breaks 
down farmland turnover from 2000 to 2010 by county, indicating that a fair amount of year-to-
year randomness exists in relative turnover rates.  The one obvious pattern in Table 2.2 is that 
much less farmland was sold near Chicago during the later portion of the 2000 to 2010 period 
than in the beginning of the decade.  This trend is explained by transitional farmland market 
dynamics that are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
From 2000 to 2010, the primary driver of booming farmland prices on the urban fringe 
was developmental pressure that transitioned farmland to nonagricultural use.  Similar to how 
Figure 2.4 shows PTR multiples in the Chicago and St. Louis areas that are far above those in the 
rest of the state, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 demonstrate that extremely high farmland prices have 
historically clustered around Cook County and its five bordering collar counties.  Together, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Figure 2.8 bases estimated arms-length turnover on the USDA’s estimate that 53 percent of farmland transfers are 
between related parties (Nickerson et al., 2012). 
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six counties are home to nearly two-thirds of Illinois’ population (U.S. Census Bureau).  During 
the early 2000s, high demand for residential development property led to sky-high farmland 
prices in urban-influenced areas.  IDOR transfer declarations indicate that, from 2000 to 2006, 
transitional sales accounted for 15.9 percent of farmland sales in the Chicago region, 9.0 percent 
of farmland sales in the St. Louis region, and 4.8 percent of farmland sales in the remainder of 
the state.  The disparity between urban-influenced farmland prices and non-urban farmland 
prices is displayed in Figure 2.11.6    
The IDOR data summarized by Figure 2.11 reveal that farmland prices in the Chicago 
and St. Louis regions were 125 percent higher and 45 percent higher, respectively, than farmland 
prices in Illinois’ other regions in 2006.  The price growth patterns of farmland in the state’s 
urban and non-urban regions diverged shortly thereafter as the residential housing market 
collapsed.  Figure 2.11 shows that farmland prices in the Chicago region dipped considerably in 
2007 and farmland price growth in the St. Louis region slowed beginning in 2006.  Indeed, from 
2006 to 2010, farmland prices in the Chicago region declined at an annually compounded rate of 
2.8 percent and farmland prices in the St. Louis region grew just 3.8 percent per year.  Farmland 
price growth in these regions lagged behind the remainder of the state, where prices increased at 
an annually compounded rate of 6.0 percent from 2006 to 2010. 
Inter-regional farmland price disparities are also visible in Figure 2.13.  Figure 2.13 uses 
parcel-level data collected by the ISPFMRA to describe average farmland prices by region.  
Because farmland is heterogeneous in quality, the prices shown in Figure 2.13 are adjusted by 
dividing a parcel’s sale price by its productivity index.7  To further homogenize the sample, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Regions are defined according to ISPFMRA guidelines.  See Figure 2.12 for a map of ISPFMRA regions. 
7 The productivity index that serves as the denominator in price per productivity index point calculations is the 100-
point scale originally devised by Grano (1963). 
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parcels were only analyzed if they were over 90 percent tillable and classified as “excellent,” 
“good,” “average,” or “fair” by the ISPFMRA.8  Three important patterns are evident in Figure 
2.13.  First, on a quality-adjusted basis, Illinois farmland prices experienced strong growth from 
2001 to 2010.  Second, farmland prices near Chicago (region 1) and St. Louis (region 8) 
exceeded those in other areas of the state due to transitional opportunities.  Finally, quality-
adjusted farmland prices near Chicago leveled off beginning in 2006 as the transitional farmland 
market declined. 
The shift in urban-influenced farmland markets coincides with major macroeconomic 
events.  As the housing market collapsed and the national economy worsened during the second 
half of the 2000 to 2010 period, demand for transitional farmland was severely reduced.  Indeed, 
between 2005 and 2008, residential building permits issued in the Chicago region dropped by 
over 80 percent (U.S. Census Bureau).  Transitional farmland sales also declined markedly in the 
latter portion of the 2000 to 2010 period.  As Figure 2.14 shows, in 2010, the transitional sale 
rates for the Chicago region, the St. Louis region, and the remainder of Illinois were each 
roughly one-fifth of their respective peaks for the decade.9  However, due to its reliance on 
transitional sales early in the decade, the Chicago region farmland market was disproportionately 
hurt by reduced transitional farmland demand from 2006 to 2010.  The Chicago region is 
representative of urban-influenced farmland throughout Illinois that stagnated in value as 
demand for transitional farmland flagged.  In contrast, the slumping rural housing market had a 
negligible impact on rural farmland prices (Nickerson, et al., 2012).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 These classifications refer to a parcel’s agricultural productivity and are only assigned to parcels sold for 
agricultural purposes.  Parcels sold primarily for nonagricultural uses are described by classifications such as 
“recreational” and “transitional.”  Accordingly, Figure 2.11 reflects a sample of purely agricultural land sales. 
9 IDOR transfer declarations include information on a parcel’s current and intended use, allowing a transitional sales 
rate to be created.  The transitional sales rate is the number of parcels sold with a non-farm intended use divided by 
the total number of parcels sold. 
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In addition to driving farmland prices near population centers, transitional farmland sales 
stimulated farmland market activity around Illinois through §1031 exchanges.  Section 1031 of 
the United States tax code allows capital gains taxes on certain properties to be deferred if the 
property is exchanged for similar property of equal or greater value.  During the early 2000s, 
§1031 exchanges gave owners of valuable transitional farmland an opportunity to cash out their 
gains and expand their landholdings with less expensive rural farmland.  In Illinois, the increased 
frequency of §1031 exchanges paralleled the skyrocketing price of transitional farmland.  
According to the ISPFMRA, §1031 exchanges peaked in 2005 when they accounted for 56 
percent of all farmland transfers in the state (ISPFMRA, 2006).  Furthermore, the ISPFMRA 
estimates that 57 percent of that year’s §1031 exchanges originated in the Chicago area.  The 
disproportionate influence of §1031 buyers from the Chicago area was due to the extreme price 
differential between Chicago area farmland and downstate farmland.  In 2005, transitional 
farmland prices in Chicago’s collar counties were over eight times greater than downstate 
farmland prices, enabling §1031 exchangers to increase their owned acreage at the same rate 
(ISPFMRA, 2006).  In short, even small sales of Chicago area farmland had a resounding impact 
on the demand for downstate farmland.   
The peripheries of Chicago’s collar counties and other population centers were 
particularly common exchange targets due to the locational preferences of §1031 buyers from 
these areas.  Demand from §1031 exchanges flooded farmland markets throughout Illinois until 
around 2006.  In fact, survey respondents cited §1031 exchanges as the most important driver of 
then-record farmland prices in 2004 and 2005 (ISPFMRA, 2005; ISPFMRA, 2006).  Precipitated 
by the plummeting transitional farmland market, §1031 exchanges dropped substantially in 2007, 
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allowing local buyers to reemerge as the primary players in downstate farmland markets.  By 
2008, there were “essentially no” §1031 buyers of Illinois farmland (ISPFMRA, 2009).   
Strong demand for recreational farmland was another noteworthy dimension of the 
Illinois farmland market from 2000 to 2010.  The market for recreational farmland is 
fundamentally different than the market for traditional farmland.  Recreational farmland is 
purchased for a wide range of purposes.  During the 2000 to 2010 period, some of the most 
popular reasons for recreational purchases in Illinois were access to hunting and recreational 
water bodies.  Compared to other farmland buyers, recreational farmland buyers are generally 
less concerned with the income potential of parcels and are more influenced by emotional or 
consumptive motives.10  In Illinois, a noticeable correlation exists between areas with many 
recreational farmland sales and areas with relatively low productivity land.  This correlation 
exists due to multiple factors.  First, undesirable agricultural characteristics such as varied 
topography, woods, water, and small or unusual parcel size are tolerable, and frequently 
desirable, in recreational parcels.  In addition, low productivity farmland is less expensive to bid 
out of agricultural use than is high productivity farmland.  Accordingly, although there are 
isolated recreational farmland sales throughout the state, recreational farmland markets are 
relatively most active in western and southern Illinois. 
Recreational farmland purchases are very difficult to identify without considerable area-
specific knowledge, making the annual reports prepared by the ISPFMRA valuable sources for 
tracking recreational farmland transactions.  According to the ISPFMRA, recreational farmland 
prices increased at rates equal to or greater than those of other land classes for much of the 2000 
to 2010 period.  Growth in recreational farmland prices was particularly strong in the middle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Some recreational purchasers were able to generate an income stream through conservation payments. 
Recreational leases also provided current income. 
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the decade.  Of the nine ISPFMRA regions that reported recreational farmland price trend data in 
2005, six reported price increases of ten percent or more in the previous year (ISPFMRA, 2006).  
In 2006, this figure climbed to seven out of eight regions (ISPFMRA, 2007).  Surging 
recreational farmland demand in Illinois was part of a nationwide phenomenon.  Indeed, nearly 
two-thirds of Kansas City Federal Reserve District bankers surveyed in December 2005 cited 
recreation as a major reason for farmland purchases by nonfarmers (Novack, 2005).   
As the macroeconomic climate soured, demand for recreational farmland cooled.  
Recreational farmland prices softened in some parts of Illinois beginning in 2008.  By 2009, 
recreational farmland prices across the state were in decline or growing very slowly.  It is 
important to note that, despite record-setting prices during the 2000 to 2010 period, recreational 
farmland prices remained low relative to other land classes.  In most regions of Illinois, 
recreational farmland prices were equal to or below prices of the most marginal agricultural 
lands studied by the ISPFMRA.  In other words, strong demand for recreational farmland during 
the 2000 to 2010 period merely lifted prices in the bottom tier of the Illinois farmland market. 
As outlined above, numerous factors combine to tell the story of Illinois farmland’s rapid 
price appreciation between 2000 and 2010.  The fundamental source of farmland price growth 
was high farm incomes capitalized at record low interest rates.  Furthermore, early in the 2000 to 
2010 period, buyers from outside agriculture constituted a major segment of demand as they 
sought investment opportunities and transitional or recreational farmland.  Although 
nonagricultural demand receded with the general economy, Illinois farmland prices continued to 
boom due to the state’s strong agricultural economy.   
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2.4  Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Nominal and Real Illinois Farmland Prices, 1979-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Actual and Imputed Illinois Farmland Prices, 1979-2010 
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Figure 2.3.  Farm Real Estate as Share of Farm Assets, 1960-2010 
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Figure 2.4.  Illinois Price-to-Rent Multiples by County, 2005 
 
DE KALB
CALHOUN
KANE
DU PAGE
MORGAN
CASS
BUREAU
SANGAMON
CHRISTIAN
EDGAR
ROCK ISLAND
LA SALLE
SCOTT
SAINT CLAIR
PIKE
LEE
OGLE
WABASH
PUTNAM
DE WITT
HENDERSON
WHITESIDE
STEPHENSON
GREENE
COLES
STARK
HENRY
CARROLL
MOULTRIE
UNION
MENARD
MONROE
MCHENRY
MERCER
GALLATIN
MCDONOUGH
MADISON
SHELBY
PIATT
KNOX
JO DAVIESS
EDWARDS
RANDOLPH
MASSAC
JERSEY
MACON
LOGAN
MASON
DOUGLAS
MACOUPIN
WINNEBAGO
MARSHALL
TAZEWELL
WHITE
PULASKI
BOONE
LAWRENCE
MONTGOMERY
WARREN
CUMBERLAND
PEORIA
VERMILION
FULTON
ALEXANDER
KENDALL
CLARK
CHAMPAIGN
BROWN
JACKSON
COOK
MCLEAN
SCHUYLER
HAMILTON
CRAWFORD
WOODFORD
PERRY
POPE
SALINE
CLINTON
LAKE
WASHINGTON
IROQUOIS
JEFFERSON
KANKAKEE
WILLIAMSON
HANCOCK
FRANKLIN
ADAMS
EFFINGHAM
FAYETTE
GRUNDY
HARDIN
JASPER
JOHNSON
WILL
WAYNE
MARION
BOND
FORD
LIVINGSTON
RICHLAND
CLAY
PTR Multiple, 2005
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
Greater than 45
NA
Less than 20
Source: FBFM
CHICAGO
ST. LOUIS
 19  
	  
Figure 2.5.  Average Corn and Soybean Prices Received by Illinois Farmers, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  Average Illinois Cash Rents and Net Farm Incomes, 2000-2010 
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Table 2.1.  Average Cash Rent Trends for Illinois Counties, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7.  Annual Returns for Illinois Farmland and Other Assets, 2000-2010 
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Year 
 
 
Counties Sampled 
 
Percent of Counties 
Increased from Prior Year 
 
Average Change from 
Previous Year 
 
2000 89 46.07% -0.69% 
2001 90 51.11% 2.98% 
2002 89 46.07% -2.45% 
2003 87 64.37% 3.39% 
2004 91 78.02% 8.07% 
2005 86 50.00% -1.54% 
2006 83 71.08% 4.09% 
2007 85 87.06% 10.17% 
2008 90 86.67% 16.51% 
2009 89 61.80% 3.67% 
2010 88 65.91% 5.17% 
 
    Source: FBFM	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Figure 2.8.  Illinois Farmland Turnover, 2000-2010 
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Table 2.2.  Share of Illinois Farmland Turnover by County, 2000-2010 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Adams 1.72% 1.50% 1.44% 1.32% 1.42% 1.51% 2.07% 2.05% 1.83% 1.86% 1.81% 
Alexander 0.13% 0.30% 0.36% 0.19% 0.20% 0.85% 0.40% 0.42% 0.27% 0.18% 0.53% 
Bond 0.64% 0.72% 0.53% 0.46% 0.60% 0.86% 0.92% 0.68% 0.68% 0.85% 0.61% 
Boone 0.57% 0.62% 0.42% 0.57% 0.46% 0.76% 0.43% 0.44% 0.46% 0.37% 0.58% 
Brown 0.41% 0.48% 0.51% 0.96% 0.81% 0.76% 1.30% 0.62% 0.55% 0.87% 0.94% 
Bureau 2.14% 1.51% 1.62% 1.94% 2.43% 2.24% 2.65% 1.80% 1.85% 1.56% 1.53% 
Calhoun 0.49% 0.37% 0.61% 0.35% 0.56% 0.80% 0.76% 0.32% 0.50% 0.54% 0.51% 
Carroll 1.11% 1.29% 1.07% 0.82% 0.91% 0.46% 0.96% 0.50% 0.62% 0.80% 1.13% 
Cass 0.69% 0.43% 0.49% 0.45% 0.37% 0.91% 0.60% 0.85% 0.58% 0.85% 0.44% 
Champaign 1.41% 2.69% 2.75% 1.95% 1.77% 2.13% 2.49% 2.39% 1.54% 2.37% 1.58% 
Christian 0.93% 1.06% 2.25% 0.96% 1.26% 1.16% 1.75% 1.51% 1.43% 1.64% 1.01% 
Clark 0.88% 0.71% 0.90% 0.75% 0.95% 0.61% 1.07% 0.63% 1.04% 1.11% 1.04% 
Clay 0.84% 0.59% 0.70% 0.80% 0.68% 0.75% 0.98% 0.89% 1.31% 0.74% 1.15% 
Clinton 0.67% 0.63% 0.47% 0.47% 0.58% 0.56% 0.51% 0.81% 0.73% 0.64% 0.70% 
Coles 0.83% 0.88% 1.00% 0.92% 1.08% 1.07% 0.91% 1.28% 1.01% 0.82% 0.88% 
Cook 0.12% 0.16% 0.19% 0.39% 0.07% 0.17% 0.13% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Crawford 0.68% 0.66% 0.68% 0.60% 0.90% 0.64% 0.62% 0.66% 0.64% 0.67% 0.47% 
Cumberland 0.64% 0.60% 0.49% 0.53% 0.77% 0.42% 0.47% 0.57% 0.72% 0.55% 0.37% 
De Kalb 1.62% 1.37% 1.71% 1.39% 1.43% 1.66% 1.31% 1.00% 1.19% 1.43% 1.27% 
De Witt 1.04% 0.64% 0.46% 0.68% 0.82% 1.07% 1.06% 1.20% 0.97% 1.08% 0.81% 
Douglas 0.99% 0.87% 0.75% 1.44% 1.13% 1.06% 0.82% 0.93% 0.64% 0.72% 0.97% 
Du Page 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
Edgar 1.57% 1.22% 0.99% 1.24% 1.14% 0.92% 1.27% 1.34% 1.18% 0.90% 1.07% 
Edwards 0.22% 0.34% 0.28% 0.37% 0.29% 0.20% 0.12% 0.34% 0.21% 0.16% 0.12% 
Effingham 0.52% 0.74% 0.42% 0.53% 0.49% 0.53% 0.41% 0.51% 0.64% 0.73% 0.56% 
Fayette 1.84% 1.15% 1.31% 1.18% 1.14% 0.92% 1.23% 1.66% 1.10% 1.37% 0.99% 
Ford 1.06% 1.36% 1.25% 1.13% 1.12% 1.42% 0.78% 1.16% 1.51% 0.81% 1.27% 
Franklin 0.41% 0.64% 0.63% 0.62% 0.75% 0.52% 0.47% 0.54% 0.75% 0.98% 0.46% 
Fulton 1.91% 3.87% 2.03% 1.71% 2.09% 1.75% 1.77% 1.93% 2.67% 2.57% 1.66% 
Gallatin 0.62% 0.43% 0.35% 0.26% 0.33% 0.41% 0.71% 0.28% 0.36% 0.32% 0.72% 
Greene 1.01% 1.32% 0.87% 0.78% 0.80% 0.93% 1.77% 1.46% 1.57% 1.37% 1.52% 
Grundy 0.95% 0.91% 1.32% 0.72% 0.98% 0.62% 0.50% 0.66% 0.41% 0.32% 0.40% 
Hamilton 0.49% 0.61% 0.88% 0.86% 0.82% 0.68% 1.00% 0.65% 0.91% 0.98% 1.00% 
Hancock 1.30% 1.04% 0.88% 1.22% 1.14% 1.56% 1.07% 1.50% 1.18% 0.69% 1.66% 
Hardin 0.35% 0.26% 0.21% 0.20% 0.20% 0.27% 0.34% 0.26% 0.20% 0.18% 0.15% 
Henderson 0.47% 0.49% 1.11% 0.82% 0.58% 1.05% 0.67% 0.88% 0.56% 1.24% 0.97% 
Henry 1.78% 1.34% 1.41% 2.40% 1.73% 1.82% 1.73% 1.66% 2.22% 1.96% 1.38% 
Iroquois 2.15% 3.01% 2.66% 2.91% 2.56% 2.41% 2.09% 2.85% 1.91% 2.29% 1.92% 
Jackson 0.72% 0.76% 0.46% 0.92% 0.70% 0.89% 0.68% 0.74% 0.54% 0.97% 0.77% 
Jasper 0.71% 0.41% 0.77% 0.77% 0.60% 0.67% 0.52% 0.69% 0.49% 0.47% 0.57% 
Jefferson 1.14% 0.95% 1.16% 0.75% 1.01% 1.17% 0.64% 0.76% 0.98% 1.45% 1.03% 
Jersey 0.78% 0.56% 0.77% 0.54% 0.82% 0.40% 1.04% 1.05% 0.66% 0.59% 0.73% 
Jo Daviess 1.85% 1.27% 1.32% 1.41% 1.31% 1.42% 0.91% 0.90% 1.08% 0.90% 1.23% 
Johnson 0.94% 0.71% 0.40% 0.24% 0.61% 0.44% 0.43% 0.23% 0.45% 0.47% 0.46% 
Kane 1.13% 1.84% 0.84% 0.77% 0.90% 0.71% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 
Kankakee 1.72% 1.74% 1.54% 2.35% 2.66% 2.36% 1.89% 1.36% 1.66% 1.58% 1.14% 
Kendall 1.18% 0.68% 0.80% 0.57% 0.87% 0.47% 0.27% 0.59% 0.42% 0.50% 0.44% 
Know 1.34% 1.85% 1.20% 1.48% 2.09% 1.32% 1.46% 1.58% 1.43% 1.48% 1.76% 
Lake 0.26% 0.21% 0.21% 0.08% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 
La Salle 2.31% 2.24% 2.10% 2.20% 2.12% 2.18% 2.35% 1.77% 2.08% 2.39% 2.36% 
Lawrence 0.94% 0.43% 0.64% 0.80% 0.60% 0.52% 0.78% 0.80% 0.65% 0.66% 0.97% 
Lee 1.41% 1.55% 1.59% 1.52% 2.05% 1.18% 1.60% 1.24% 1.39% 1.21% 2.14% 
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Table 2.2.  Share of Illinois Farmland Turnover by County, 2000-2010 (cont.) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Livingston 2.33% 1.87% 2.09% 2.03% 2.08% 2.87% 2.17% 1.40% 1.74% 1.22% 1.66% 
Logan 1.35% 0.85% 1.53% 1.35% 0.71% 1.04% 1.02% 1.92% 1.28% 1.29% 0.96% 
McDonough 1.86% 1.11% 1.72% 1.02% 1.08% 1.28% 1.36% 1.49% 1.46% 1.44% 1.56% 
McHenry 1.84% 1.72% 1.63% 1.78% 1.04% 0.86% 1.12% 0.47% 0.58% 0.61% 0.90% 
McLean 1.46% 2.86% 2.05% 2.79% 2.15% 3.00% 3.20% 3.11% 3.06% 2.47% 2.77% 
Macon 1.04% 1.10% 0.95% 1.33% 0.89% 0.74% 1.18% 1.15% 1.36% 1.26% 1.35% 
Macoupin 1.05% 1.44% 1.33% 1.25% 1.27% 1.18% 1.22% 1.92% 1.77% 1.78% 0.99% 
Madison 1.21% 0.50% 0.94% 1.15% 0.56% 0.85% 0.58% 0.67% 0.33% 0.59% 0.97% 
Marion 1.05% 1.31% 1.26% 1.19% 1.20% 1.15% 0.99% 1.21% 1.26% 1.75% 0.94% 
Marshall 1.12% 1.07% 0.89% 0.81% 0.74% 0.66% 0.61% 0.50% 1.27% 0.63% 0.75% 
Mason 0.57% 0.97% 0.65% 0.75% 0.86% 0.57% 0.97% 0.89% 0.97% 0.88% 0.71% 
Massac 0.18% 0.21% 0.23% 0.47% 0.31% 0.42% 0.19% 0.39% 0.20% 0.31% 0.42% 
Menard 0.45% 1.39% 1.12% 0.41% 0.62% 0.53% 0.68% 0.45% 0.32% 0.38% 0.38% 
Mercer 0.72% 1.03% 1.24% 1.20% 0.96% 1.36% 0.71% 1.15% 1.20% 1.04% 1.32% 
Monroe 1.11% 0.49% 0.61% 0.39% 0.55% 0.39% 0.50% 0.49% 0.28% 0.42% 0.74% 
Montgomery 0.99% 0.82% 0.94% 0.90% 1.52% 1.17% 1.05% 1.05% 1.82% 2.45% 2.08% 
Morgan 1.05% 1.09% 1.17% 1.14% 1.28% 1.08% 0.95% 0.88% 1.49% 1.29% 1.13% 
Moultrie 0.91% 0.68% 0.77% 0.94% 1.09% 0.93% 0.80% 0.71% 0.58% 0.66% 0.51% 
Ogle 1.04% 2.17% 1.30% 1.83% 1.28% 1.34% 1.36% 1.30% 1.21% 1.44% 2.12% 
Peoria 1.13% 0.94% 0.80% 0.85% 0.87% 0.69% 1.05% 0.53% 0.77% 0.55% 0.63% 
Perry 0.51% 0.33% 0.42% 0.50% 0.82% 0.52% 0.64% 0.78% 1.01% 0.54% 0.65% 
Piatt 0.70% 1.05% 0.76% 0.86% 1.20% 1.34% 1.58% 1.36% 0.74% 0.89% 0.83% 
Pike 1.40% 1.49% 2.26% 1.68% 2.41% 2.56% 3.50% 4.04% 2.76% 3.21% 2.96% 
Pope 0.53% 0.38% 0.33% 0.48% 0.76% 1.10% 0.32% 0.47% 0.54% 0.26% 0.74% 
Pulaski 0.37% 0.46% 0.54% 0.37% 0.24% 0.40% 0.34% 0.34% 0.28% 0.45% 0.09% 
Putnam 0.14% 0.66% 0.21% 0.20% 0.22% 0.29% 0.29% 0.31% 0.19% 0.21% 0.43% 
Randolph 0.54% 0.83% 0.68% 0.69% 0.57% 0.48% 0.58% 0.56% 0.80% 0.96% 0.94% 
Richland 0.44% 0.39% 0.41% 0.58% 0.59% 0.50% 0.38% 0.30% 0.66% 0.52% 0.45% 
Rock Island 0.36% 0.50% 0.38% 1.63% 0.73% 0.50% 0.35% 0.54% 0.72% 0.80% 0.64% 
St. Clair 0.65% 0.61% 0.70% 0.58% 0.54% 0.54% 0.68% 0.70% 0.51% 0.93% 0.66% 
Saline 1.21% 0.57% 0.55% 0.39% 0.50% 0.64% 0.47% 1.22% 0.41% 0.66% 0.77% 
Sangamon 1.18% 1.54% 1.08% 1.66% 2.05% 1.27% 1.32% 1.54% 1.56% 1.35% 0.74% 
Schuyler 1.24% 1.20% 1.33% 0.89% 1.35% 1.49% 0.83% 0.91% 1.36% 0.76% 0.96% 
Scott 0.29% 0.24% 0.36% 0.40% 0.53% 0.17% 0.35% 0.43% 0.37% 0.59% 0.34% 
Shelby 1.42% 1.30% 1.55% 1.37% 1.58% 1.61% 1.52% 1.48% 1.19% 1.20% 1.19% 
Stark 0.31% 0.45% 0.51% 0.52% 0.52% 0.19% 0.68% 0.67% 0.65% 0.66% 0.79% 
Stephenson 1.15% 0.82% 1.62% 1.28% 1.10% 1.29% 1.80% 1.19% 1.26% 1.43% 1.62% 
Tazewell 0.75% 0.92% 1.33% 1.19% 0.75% 0.98% 1.14% 0.80% 1.18% 1.18% 0.72% 
Union 0.48% 0.48% 0.29% 0.43% 0.58% 0.68% 0.45% 0.79% 0.78% 0.59% 0.86% 
Vermilion 1.66% 1.42% 1.79% 1.53% 1.36% 1.82% 1.91% 1.83% 2.26% 1.86% 2.22% 
Wabash 0.39% 0.24% 0.56% 0.28% 0.39% 0.33% 0.47% 0.29% 0.35% 0.28% 0.19% 
Warren 0.99% 0.59% 1.13% 1.09% 0.96% 1.05% 1.18% 1.08% 1.46% 0.86% 1.80% 
Washington 1.00% 0.83% 0.81% 0.67% 0.49% 0.67% 0.44% 0.55% 0.82% 0.85% 0.76% 
Wayne 1.60% 1.26% 1.31% 1.74% 1.29% 1.19% 1.16% 1.69% 1.50% 1.99% 1.58% 
White 1.13% 0.61% 0.67% 0.79% 0.68% 0.56% 0.43% 0.70% 0.62% 0.79% 0.91% 
Whiteside 1.44% 1.55% 2.31% 1.72% 1.50% 1.61% 1.60% 1.76% 2.23% 1.54% 1.86% 
Will 1.94% 1.50% 1.72% 1.80% 1.26% 1.63% 0.96% 1.02% 0.71% 0.55% 0.89% 
Williamson 0.40% 0.44% 0.37% 0.44% 0.31% 0.58% 0.54% 0.56% 0.40% 0.47% 0.34% 
Winnebago 0.91% 0.72% 0.39% 0.51% 0.95% 0.92% 0.88% 0.71% 0.81% 0.72% 0.89% 
Woodford 0.76% 0.97% 0.61% 0.86% 1.02% 0.81% 0.75% 0.73% 1.13% 1.24% 1.45% 
* Relative turnover rates express a county’s transferred farmland as a percentage of Illinois’ total transferred farmland. 
Source: IDOR 
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Figure 2.9.  Illinois Farmland Prices by County, 1982 
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Figure 2.10.  Illinois Farmland Prices by County, 2007 
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Figure 2.11.  Average Farmland Prices in the Chicago and St. Louis Regions, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12.  ISPFMRA Regions 
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Figure 2.13.  Average Illinois Farmland Prices per  
PI Point by ISMFPRA Region, 2001-2010 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.14.  Transitional Farmland Sales as Share of Farmland  
Sales in the Chicago and St. Louis Regions, 2000-2010 
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CHAPTER 3    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1    Historical Land Value Theory 
Economic history is filled with discussions of land prices and their determinants.  Early 
writers on the subject identified a connection between farmland prices and parcel-specific 
rents.11  Ricardo (1815) defines rents according to productivity differences between various 
classes of land.  Ricardo explains his theory through the example of a country where only 
extremely fertile farmland with low production costs is originally cultivated.  Figure 3.1 shows 
that no rent exists when only highly productive (Type A) land is utilized.  However, Ricardo 
posits that cultivation of inferior (Type B) land is eventually feasible due to rising crop prices 
spurred by the country’s growth.  As production begins on Type B land, operators of Type A 
land expand production from QA
1  to QA
2  and collect a rent because the new price, P2, is above 
their average cost curve.  The shaded rectangle in Figure 3.1 represents the “Ricardian rent” 
gained by operators of Type A land after Type B land comes into production.  As even less 
productive (Type C) land is cultivated, rents increase for operators of low cost farmland and 
emerge for operators of medium cost farmland.  According to Ricardo (1817), when lower 
quality farmland comes under cultivation, “rent immediately commences on that of the first 
quality and that rent will depend on the difference in quality of these two portions of land.”  
Because these rents are capitalized into the price of the scarce resource from which they are 
derived, Ricardo’s theory implies that highly productive farmland is also highly priced farmland. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ricardo and von Thünen refer to economic rents rather than cash rents.  Economic rents are residual returns to a 
scarce input and exist whether a farmland owner is a landlord or an owner-operator.  Economic rents and cash rents 
may be equivalent if a farmland owner extracts all economic rents from a tenant through cash rents. 
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In contrast to Ricardo’s focus on agricultural productivity as the source of rents, von 
Thünen emphasizes the role market distance plays in rent determination.  Von Thünen’s The 
Isolated State lays out a simple model of land use featuring a central market city surrounded by 
agricultural land of uniform fertility.  Within this model, rent disparities are created by the 
reduced transportation costs enjoyed by operators of land near the market city.  Because 
transportation costs determine the prices that producers actually receive for their crops, well-
located land increases the difference between the revenue a producer receives and the producer’s 
costs, thereby creating a rent.  Von Thünen’s theory also has implications for how agricultural 
land is used.  No matter its distance from market, land is utilized for the purpose that yields the 
greatest rent.  According to von Thünen, perishable or unwieldy crops characterized by strong 
returns and large transportation costs can only be feasibly produced near their final market.  
Additionally, land near the market city will command a premium because, ceteris paribus, all 
producers desire this land over other land.  The bidding-up of land prices continues until only the 
highest rent activity persists in an area.  Figure 3.2 offers a simple example of how crops’ 
differing rent gradients create concentric circles of land use, a hallmark of von Thünen’s 
theory.12  All told, von Thünen explains that farmland rents, and therefore farmland prices, are 
determined by urban proximity.  
In the nearly two centuries since their famous works, Ricardo and von Thünen have been 
repeatedly reinterpreted and, in some cases, marginalized.  Nevertheless, the pair left a lasting 
legacy regarding the study of farmland prices.  The writings of Ricardo and von Thünen 
demonstrate the importance of agricultural productivity and location in the determination of 
farmland rents and prices.  Together, these insights form a guide for modern research. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although Figure 3.2 is a gross oversimplification of von Thünen’s theory, the three land use gradients in the 
figure clearly illustrate that a land use only persists in an area if it is the highest rent activity in that area. 
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3.2    Supply and Demand Models 
Supply and demand systems of equations are a common way of finding a market-clearing 
price that equates quantity supplied with quantity demanded.  Several prominent simultaneous 
equation supply and demand models emerged during the 1960s to explain national aggregate 
farmland prices.  Herdt and Cochrane (1966) jointly determine the equilibrium price and quantity 
of farmland sales within a two-equation supply and demand model.  They find that technological 
advances and subsidized output prices were key determinants of farmland price changes from 
1913 to 1962.  A five-equation model used by Tweeten and Martin (1966) shows that farm 
consolidation and expansion, population pressures, and expected capital gains had the largest 
impacts on farmland prices from 1950 to 1963.  Reynolds and Timmons (1969) describe 
farmland prices from 1933 to 1965 through a two-equation model.  Similar to Tweeten and 
Martin, they attribute much of the variation in farmland prices to expansionary pressures, 
government payments, and expected capital gains. 
Although the three models mentioned above explain their original samples well, retesting 
by Pope et al. (1979) reveals many reversed or insignificant signs when each specification is 
applied to 1946 through 1972 data.  The analysis of Pope et al. created skepticism regarding 
simultaneous equation models of farmland supply and demand.  Supply and demand models also 
fell out of favor with researchers due to the nature of the farmland market.  Specifically, the 
supply of farmland is generally thin and inelastic.  As a result, Burt (1986) contends that two-
equation farmland price models are inadequate due to the absence of a true, identifiable supply 
function for farmland.  Another drawback of classic supply and demand models is the 
assumption of homogeneity among goods, which is not realistic in the farmland market.  Based 
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on the preceding critiques, supply and demand models of farmland prices have been used 
relatively infrequently in recent scholarship. 
 
3.3  Net Present Value Models 
One of the most common and intuitive explanations of farmland prices is the net present 
value model.  The net present value model describes the value of farmland analogously to the 
value of any other income-generating asset.  That is, the value of a farmland parcel is the sum of 
its expected residual returns discounted to the present day.  Algebraically: 
(3.1) V = E(Rt)
(1+rt)t
∞
t=0  
where V is the current value of a farmland parcel, E(Rt) is the expected residual return in period 
t, and rt is the discount rate.  If both returns and the discount rate are assumed to be constant, 
equation (3.1) simplifies to: 
(3.2) V = E(R)
r
 . 
Similar to historical theory, the capitalization model described above draws a clear connection 
between residual returns and farmland prices.  Granger causality tests conducted by Phipps 
(1984) confirm the linkage between farm incomes and farmland prices, showing that farmland 
prices were unidirectionally determined by residual returns from 1940 to 1979.  In short, the net 
present value model of farmland places agricultural returns at the forefront of farmland price 
determination.  
A host of authors successfully explain farmland prices with net present value models 
based on agricultural income.  Burt (1986) analyzes aggregate Illinois farmland prices from 1959 
through 1982 to determine whether residual returns explained farmland prices better than 
expected inflation or capital gains.  He finds that a second-order rational distributed lag of prices 
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and rents predicted much of the variation in farmland prices, thereby demonstrating residual 
returns’ primacy in farmland valuation.  Likewise, Alston (1986) regresses state-level farmland 
prices from eight Midwestern states on discounted net rents, expected capital gains, and expected 
inflation.  His results show that farm income was the dominant determinant of farmland prices.  
More recently, Schnitkey and Sherrick (2011) apply the basic net present value formula in 
equation (3.2) to aggregate Illinois farmland prices from the past four decades.  With the 
exception of a major disparity that peaked in 1981, farmland prices closely followed the imputed 
prices the authors created using average cash rent data.  Weersink et al. (1999) reconfigure 
equation (3.2) to include the two main sources of farm income: market earnings and government 
payments.  Their model allows market earnings and government payments to be capitalized at 
different rates, revealing that subsidies had a greater impact on Ontario farmland prices than did 
market earnings over the 1947 to 1993 timeframe.  Goodwin et al. (2003) investigate farm-level 
data from 1998 to 2001 and find that government payments contributed significantly to farmland 
prices even though different payment types were capitalized at different rates.   
Extensions of the net present value model increase its realism and applicability.  For 
instance, as Capozza and Helsley (1989) explain, the net present value of farmland that will one 
day be converted to nonagricultural use is the sum of its discounted pre-conversion agricultural 
returns and discounted post-conversion nonagricultural returns, less conversion costs.  Potential 
conversion to nonagricultural use changes equation (3.1) into: 
(3.3) V = E(ARt)
(1+rt)t
T
t=0  + 
E(NRt)
(1+rt)t
∞
t=T   – C  
where E(ARt) is the expected current agricultural return, E(NRt) is the expected future 
nonagricultural return, T is the time of irreversible conversion to nonagricultural use, and C is the 
cost of conversion to nonagricultural use.  A number of authors explore farmland prices through 
 33  
	  
this more comprehensive lens.  Hardie et al. (2001) apply the conceptual framework of Capozza 
and Helsley to 1982, 1987, and 1992 county-level data from the mid-Atlantic region.  Their 
simultaneous equation model of residential and agricultural land shows that farmland prices were 
more responsive to nonagricultural factors than agricultural factors.  Moreover, Plantinga et al. 
(2002) find that approximately one-tenth of the United States’ total farmland value in 1997 was 
attributable to future nonagricultural returns. 
Of late, farmland markets have been influenced by growing income streams and expected 
capital gains.  The net present value model can be altered to account for these elements.  
Melichar (1979) suggests adding the expected growth of returns to the net present value model, 
turning equation (3.2) into: 
(3.4) V = E(R)(1+g)
(r-g)
  
where g is the expected growth rate of returns to farmland.  Within this model, Melichar 
successfully describes farm asset value growth as a function of expected capital gains and 
expected residual returns.  Melichar’s modification is important in light of literature establishing 
a deterministic linkage between capital gains and farmland values.  For example, Klinefelter 
(1973) explains nearly all of the variation in aggregate Illinois farm values from 1951 to 1970 
through residual returns, average farm size, total farm transfers, and capital gains.  Failure to 
account for capital gains may explain the poor results of the net present value models utilized by 
Falk (1991) and Clark et al. (1993).  Overall, the simplicity of the net present value model and its 
flexibility to useful extensions create a strong framework for understanding farmland prices. 
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3.4  Hedonic Models 
Hedonic modeling is yet another tool for analyzing farmland prices.  Hedonic models 
decompose a farmland parcel into its important characteristics, thereby accounting for 
heterogeneity among parcels.  This acknowledgement of farmland’s heterogeneity contrasts 
markedly with the homogeneity assumption underpinning supply and demand models.  
Furthermore, unlike net present value models, hedonic models are not tied to a specific theory of 
farmland prices.  Hedonic models instead assume that implicit markets for farmland 
characteristics combine to form a farmland parcel’s price.  A characteristic’s implicit price can 
only be assessed within a parcel’s entire sale price because markets for individual characteristics 
do not actually exist.  Hedonic farmland models are typically grounded in attributes related to 
agricultural productivity, reflecting the connection between agricultural returns and farmland 
prices expressed by net present value models.  That said, contrary to direct descendants of the net 
present value model, hedonic farmland models rarely account for market-based income explicitly 
and instead include parcel traits that predict income potential or owner utility.   
Hedonic farmland models are applied across the full spectrum of farmland markets.  
Chicoine (1981) conducts a parcel-level study of farmland transactions at the rural-urban frontier 
in Will County, Illinois, from 1970 to 1974.  His hedonic model reveals that proximity to 
Chicago, contiguity with a town, and road accessibility boosted farmland prices while soil 
productivity failed to significantly impact sale price.  Stewart and Libby (1998) analyze farmland 
prices under urban pressure using a small sample of DeKalb County, Illinois, farmland sales 
from 1995.  They ascribe positive influences to the absence of large-lot zoning, proximity to 
state roads, and improvements but assign little significance to agricultural explanatory variables.  
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Hedonic models considering wider or less urbanized geographic areas assign greater 
importance to agricultural characteristics.  Although population density is the most influential 
variable in his study of 1949 to 1978 state-level farmland prices, Peterson (1986) determines that 
desirable weather, soil, and irrigation also significantly lifted farmland prices.  Miranowski and 
Hammes (1984) convincingly model Iowa farmland prices on three measures of soil quality.  
Parcel-level analysis by Xu et al. (1993) confirms the significance of soil productivity as a 
determinant of farmland prices and also assigns explanatory importance to improvements, 
proximity to towns, and parcel size.  Oltmans et al. (1988) discover that soil productivity, 
improvements, proximity to market, and proximity to Chicago and other cities positively 
influenced Illinois county-level farmland prices from 1975 to 1984.  Although Oltmans et al. 
successfully describe Illinois farmland prices with a relatively simple hedonic model, the authors 
fail to account for spatial relationships within their data set.  Similar work by Huang et al. (2006) 
improves upon this shortcoming by explicitly modeling spatial relatedness.  Huang et al. find that 
Illinois county-level farmland prices were significantly impacted by soil productivity, 
improvements, distances to population centers, parcel size, per capita income, population 
density, and swine farm density from 1979 to 2000. 
Multiple authors use hedonic models to measure how government payments impact 
farmland prices.  The hedonic results of Veeman et al. (1993) lead them to predict 18 percent 
long run declines in Canadian farmland prices if government transfers ceased.  Barnard et al. 
(1997) identify the Corn Belt as a region where government payments were capitalized into 
farmland prices at a relatively high rate.  Furthermore, Barnard et al. (2001) discover that 
government payments were capitalized into farmland prices differently than market-based 
earnings due to uncertainty about government payment programs. 
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Hedonic models can also quantify the influence of recreational and amenity factors on 
farmland prices.  Drescher et al. (2001) create a detailed model that reveals natural amenities’ 
significant influence on Minnesota farmland prices in 1996.  Likewise, Guiling et al. (2007) 
model Oklahoma farmland prices from 2001 to 2005 on a host of agricultural and nonagricultural 
factors.  They uncover a positive and significant impact of deer harvest density on parcel-level 
farmland prices.  Henderson and Moore (2006) regress Texas county-level farmland prices on 
agricultural, population, and recreational attributes.  Positive and significant coefficients for deer 
density and recreational income convince the authors that recreational value is an 
underappreciated contributor to farmland prices.   
The preceding review underscores the extensive nature of farmland price literature.  A 
few common threads exist among the many theoretical and empirical approaches employed in 
the study of farmland prices.  First, no matter the research question being tackled, agricultural 
productivity must be addressed in any discussion of farmland prices.  Second, development 
pressure has emerged as a major topic within farmland price literature.  Finally, amenity factors 
are viewed as critical determinants of farmland values in many areas.  Altogether, the works 
highlighted in this chapter create a springboard for future research on farmland prices. 
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3.5  Figures  
Figure 3.1.  Ricardo’s Theory of Rent Determination 
 
 
 
 
         
          
        
 
  
  
 
  
 
     
 
 
         
           
 
 
      
 
  
           
     
 
     
  
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
           
     
 
     
           
                       
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Von Thünen’s Theory of Rent Determination and Land Use 
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CHAPTER 4    MODEL, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Hedonic Model 
This study describes farmland prices through a hedonic model.  Like many real world 
markets, farmland markets are characterized by heterogeneous products.  Therefore, it is difficult 
to describe farmland prices through traditional supply and demand equations that assume 
homogeneity among products.  Hedonic modeling is a useful alternative to supply and demand 
models because it explicitly accounts for differences among heterogeneous products.  Hedonic 
models are used extensively in studies of residential and commercial real estate.  Furthermore, 
hedonic models are utilized by a host of authors to depict the inherent heterogeneity in farmland 
markets (Chicoine, 1981; Palmquist, 1989; Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; Shi et al., 1997; 
Bastian et al., 2002; Vasquez et al., 2002; Taylor and Brester, 2005; Henderson and Moore, 
2006; Huang et al., 2006; Guiling et al., 2007).   
The hedonic methodology is formalized by Rosen (1974).  Applying Rosen’s general 
methodology to the market for farmland, a parcel of farmland can be described as a 
comprehensive vector, Z, of n characteristics, such that: 
(4.1)  Z = (z1,  z2, . . . ,  zn).   
Characteristics commonly included in hedonic representations of farmland include soil quality, 
location, improvements, and amenity level.  In line with the hedonic view of farmland as the sum 
of its characteristic components, a parcel’s price, p, can be conceptualized as a function of its 
bundled characteristics.  That is:  
(4.2) p = p(z1,  z2, . . . ,  zn).   
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Sale prices reached during transactions between utility-maximizing buyers and sellers of various 
farmland characteristic packages make it possible to assign a price to each characteristic.  The 
partial derivative of a parcel’s price, p, with respect to a characteristic, zi, reveals the marginal 
rate of substitution between the characteristic and money.  This marginal rate of substitution is 
the implicit price for a farmland characteristic.  Formally, the implicit price of each characteristic 
can be expressed as: 
(4.3) pimplicit(zi) = 
∂p
zi
 , 
where pimplicit(zi) is the marginal contribution made by characteristic zi to the overall price of a 
parcel.  These implicit prices for farmland characteristics are analogous to the attribute values a 
residential property assessor uses to determine a house’s value.  In total, hedonic methodologies 
makes it possible to price each characteristic of a farmland parcel in the heterogeneous market 
for farmland. 
 A number of assumptions accompany hedonic models.  First, it is assumed that 
consumers choose from a continuous spectrum of characteristic bundles.  It is also assumed that 
goods are indivisible, meaning that a good’s characteristics cannot be unbundled from one 
another.  The final assumption in Rosen’s hedonic methodology is that the farmland market is in 
equilibrium.  In addition to these formal assumptions, applied researchers must make a critical 
assumption as to the area constituting a single farmland market (Miranowski and Hammes, 
1984).  Due to locational preferences and market knowledge, it is generally accepted that 
farmland markets are regional in nature (Palmquist, 1989).  In practice, states are viewed as 
acceptable representations of single farmland markets (Miranowski and Hammes, 1984; Huang 
et al., 2006).  The characteristics included in this study’s hedonic farmland model are discussed 
at length in the following section. 
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4.2  Data and Variables 
As mentioned previously, this study examines Illinois farmland prices using a hedonic 
model.  The components of this hedonic model are discussed below.  The first part of this section 
examines the IDOR data that form the foundation of this research.  Next, there is a discussion of 
how the IDOR data were shaped into this study’s dependent variable.  This section concludes 
with an overview of the explanatory variables that collectively form a hedonic model of farmland 
prices. 
 
4.2.1  IDOR Data Set 
This study’s dependent variable is per-acre farmland sale price.  Per-acre sale prices were 
constructed using Illinois farm real estate transfer declaration data obtained from IDOR.  Known 
colloquially as “green sheets,” these transfer declarations form a rich and comprehensive data set 
of farmland transfers from 1979 to 2010.13   
The IDOR data allow for farmland price analysis from multiple perspectives.  For 
example, a cross-sectional snapshot of Illinois farmland prices can be created using this data set.  
Figure 4.1 displays county-average farmland prices for Illinois in 2010.  There are obvious 
similarities between Figure 4.1 and the county-level USDA farmland prices shown in Figure 
2.10.  Both maps show high farmland values grouped in fertile central Illinois and clustered 
around metropolitan areas.  However, some slight disagreements between the two maps are 
visible.  These disagreements may be the product of different data collection methods; IDOR 
data are market-based while USDA data are landowner estimates of hypothetical market values.  
Variability in the quality and quantity of farmland transactions may impact the comparability of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The earliest data in the University of Illinois’ IDOR database are from 1979.  Until very recently, the latest 
complete year in the IDOR database was 2010.  As a result, the 1979 to 2010 time frame is analyzed in this study. 
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average IDOR farmland prices across time or space.  In other words, because every farmland 
transaction has a unique “story” behind it, average IDOR farmland prices become decreasingly 
useful as they are examined at an increasingly disaggregate level.  To demonstrate this point, 
Figure 4.2 summarizes the basic “stories” of Champaign County farmland transactions that 
occurred in 1995.  Changing the type of sales or the distribution of parcel sizes in Figure 4.2 
could have a major impact on Champaign County’s average farmland price.  Therefore, it is 
important to account for these factors when analyzing farmland prices. 
The IDOR data also offer a time series view of Illinois farmland prices.  Figure 4.3 
displays Illinois farmland prices from 1979 to 2010 based on both IDOR transfer data and USDA 
survey data.  Although the two series are nearly identical in both magnitude and trend during the 
32 years plotted in the figure, there are slight disagreements between the two that may stem from 
the sources mentioned in the previous paragraph.  Table 4.1 offers a more detailed summary of 
Illinois farmland prices from 1979 to 2010 by grouping the IDOR data according to parcel size.  
It can be seen that farmland prices have recently increased across all sale size categories.  
However, recent price growth has been relatively modest for small parcels, which are the most 
influenced by nonagricultural demand.  This information is captured graphically in Figure 4.4.  
In related analysis of the 1979 to 2010 period, Table 4.2 shows that small (10 to 19.99 acre) 
farmland sales have become relatively less common over the past three decades.  As a result, the 
average acreage transferred in Illinois farmland sales has increased over the years.  Figure 4.5 
shows that this trend is roughly proportionate to increases in Illinois’ average farm size. 
It is possible to merge the temporal and spatial components of the IDOR data to engage 
in more thorough analysis.  Figures 4.6 and 4.7 summarize Illinois farmland prices by both year 
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and ISPFMRA region.14  Figure 4.6 charts historical farmland prices in ISPFMRA regions 1 and 
8, which fall under the metropolitan influences of Chicago and St. Louis, respectively.  In both 
regions, long periods of relatively strong price growth were capped by slumping farmland prices 
just prior to 2010.  Figure 4.7 displays the evolution of farmland prices in Illinois’ other eight 
regions.  Farmland prices in these more rural regions were hit hard by the farm crisis of the 
1980s.  However, these areas experienced very strong farmland price growth in the 2000s that 
continued even as transitional farmland demand dried up.   
 
4.2.2    Dependent Variable 
For the purposes of this research, farmland sale price was calculated similarly to the 
IDOR definition of a real estate transfer’s net consideration: total sale price less the value of 
personal property included in the transfer.  Dividing sale price by total acreage transferred 
yielded sale price per acre.  A number of filters were placed on the IDOR data examined in this 
study.  First, to mitigate the largely unmeasureable heterogeneity in improved farmland sales, 
data were limited to unimproved parcels only.  Second, to ensure that the sample was composed 
of true farmland rather than previously converted land that is only nominally farm real estate, 
only sales with a current use of “farm” or “land/lot only” were considered.  Third, due to the 
significant discount that often accompanies non-arms-length land transactions, transfers between 
related parties were excluded from the data set (Tsoodle et al., 2006; Kostov, 2010).  Additional 
limits were placed on both the acreage and per-acre prices of acceptable data in order to exclude 
outliers due to measurement error and ensure that data were both reasonable and representative 
of actual farmland sales.  CPI-adjusted per-acre prices of less than $50 or greater than $25,000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  A map of ISPFMRA regions is shown in Figure 2.12.	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were removed from the IDOR sample.  Likewise, sale sizes of less than 10 acres or greater than 
1,280 acres were also excluded from the data set.15  During the 1979 to 2010 period, 99,171 
farmland transfers met all of these criteria. 
This study takes advantage of the IDOR data’s temporal and spatial dimensions.  For the 
regression analysis conducted in the next chapter, Illinois farmland prices were aggregated by 
county and year.  That is, the average farmland price for county i in year t was calculated as: 
(4.4)  PRICEit=
ppajt*acreagejt
n
j=1
acreagejt
n
j=1
 ∀  !, 
where j = 1,…, n represents individual farmland transfers within county i.  Farmland prices were 
adjusted by the CPI, meaning that this study’s dependent variable is measured in dollars held 
constant at 1982 to 1984 levels.  Not all counties have acceptable transfer data in all years.  As a 
result, some counties must be excluded from a balanced panel of average farmland prices.  For 
1979 to 2010, a balanced panel exists for 93 counties, yielding a total sample size of 2,976 
observations.  When only the 2000 to 2010 period is considered, the balanced panel can be 
expanded to 98 counties.  Descriptive statistics for county average farmland price (PRICE) from 
1979 to 2010 are contained in Table 4.3 along with descriptive statistics for other variables 
outlined in this chapter.  Table 4.4 summarizes the same variables from 2000 to 2010, a period of 
specific interest in this study.  
 
4.2.3 Explanatory Variables 
Farmland prices are determined by a host of factors, the most fundamental of which is 
agricultural productivity.  Ricardo was the first to note that highly productive farmland creates a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These exclusion rules were decided on after close examination of the data.  Similar exclusion rules are used by 
Sherrick (2012). 
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differential rent that is not available on lower quality farmland with higher production costs.  
Barry et al. (2000) apply Ricardo’s theory to Illinois, where per-acre crop production costs are 
fairly constant between regions but crop yields are highly heterogeneous.  They explain that the 
difference between operating costs and revenue is still based on farmland quality, a relationship 
depicted in Figure 4.8.  Larger residual returns exist for owners of high quality farmland because, 
in comparison to owners of more marginal lands, a smaller portion of crop revenues is lost to 
operating costs.  These returns are enjoyed by farmland owners whether or not they farm the land 
themselves.  Residual returns accrue directly in the case of owner-operators.  Equivalent income 
can be captured by landlords because, in a perfectly competitive cash rent marketplace, rents will 
be negotiated to the point where tenants are only covering their (economic) operating costs.  
Either way, there is a direct relationship between land quality and owner income.  As represented 
by present value equation (3.2), high farm incomes will be capitalized into the values of the 
scarce resource from which they stem. 
Although many factors combine to determine agricultural productivity and residual 
returns, one of the most basic is soil productivity.  In this study, soil productivity is measured 
using FBFM survey data.  In lieu of parcel-specific productivity data, the soil productivity 
ratings used herein are aggregated to the county level.  Soil productivity ratings are based on a 5 
to 100 point scale originally developed by Grano (1963) and are held constant throughout the 
1979 to 2010 period.  Figure 4.9 displays the county-level soil productivity ratings used in this 
study.  A noticeable correlation exists between the high productivity counties shown in Figure 
4.9 and the highest farmland prices shown in Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 4.2.  Based on the linkage 
between soil productivity and farmland value explained previously, soil productivity rating is 
expected to have a positive impact on county average farmland prices.  As they are for other 
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explanatory variables used in this study, the description and expected sign of the soil 
productivity rating variable (SPR) are listed in Table 4.5. 
Nonagricultural factors are also important determinants of farmland value.  Although 
proximity to population centers may impact farm incomes both positively (through opportunities 
to market high value crops) and negatively (through inefficiency brought on by regulations and 
insufficient agricultural inputs or infrastructure), it is generally accepted that the nonagricultural 
benefits of urban influence trump any of its negative agricultural implications.  According to 
present value equation (3.3), future conversion to nonagricultural use will boost a parcel’s value 
based on the expected timing and size of nonagricultural income flows.  Land in heavily 
populated areas is desirable for residential, commercial, and industrial purposes.  As a result, 
owners of urban-influenced farmland enjoy prospects for nonagricultural conversion that are 
more lucrative and numerous than those of their rural counterparts.  These transitional 
opportunities should translate into higher prices for urban-influenced farmland.  
In this study’s hedonic model, urban influence is measured using three variables: 
population density, distance from Chicago, and distance from St. Louis.  As explained in the 
preceding paragraph, farmland in densely populated areas should be more valuable than rural 
land, ceteris paribus.  The population density variable used in this study was constructed as a 
county’s mid-year population estimate divided by its land area (U.S. Census Bureau).  Illinois 
county population densities from 2010 are illustrated in Figure 4.10.  There is an obvious cluster 
of densely populated counties surrounding Chicago in northeast Illinois.  Aside from counties 
near St. Louis and other smaller population centers, downstate Illinois is relatively sparsely 
populated.  Although drastic population differences have long existed between metropolitan 
Illinois (specifically Chicago) and the remainder of the state, these differences became more 
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pronounced over the past three decades.  From 1979 to 2010, only 38 of Illinois’ 102 counties 
gained population.  The nine fastest-growing counties during this period are proximate to either 
Chicago or St. Louis, reflecting statewide trends of exploding populations along the urban fringe 
and negative population growth in rural areas (Walzer and Harger, 2011).  It is anticipated that 
high population density (POPDEN) will positively impact county-level farmland prices.   
This study’s other measures of urban influence are distances to Chicago and St. Louis.  It 
has been shown that farmland located near Chicago is the most valuable in the state.  Farmland 
in the Chicago area is subject to extreme development pressures.  In fact, on a percentage basis, 
Cook County (which is home to Chicago) and its neighbors DuPage County and Lake County 
lost more farmland between 1978 and 2007 than any other Illinois counties (USDA).  Distance to 
Chicago (CHIDIST) is included as an explanatory variable to represent the influence of 
Chicago’s huge, sprawling metropolis, which may not be fully captured by population density.  
Similarly, St. Louis’ metropolitan footprint exerts considerable development pressure on nearby 
farmland prices.  A distance to St. Louis variable (STLDIST) accounts for the price-boosting 
impact of proximity to St. Louis.  The Chicago distance and St. Louis distance variables were 
calculated as the straight-line distances from a county’s geographic centroid to Chicago and St. 
Louis, respectively.  Because farmland near Chicago or St. Louis is expected to reap a premium 
compared to more remote farmland, the hypothesized signs of Chicago distance and St. Louis 
distance are negative. 
It is important to account for parcel size when studying farmland prices.  From a purely 
agricultural perspective, per-acre farmland prices should increase with parcel size.  Large parcels 
allow for per-acre cost savings due to economies of scale.  As a result, it is expected that these 
 47  
	  
savings will cause strong demand for large parcels as potential savings are bid into prices.16  
From a broader perspective, however, per-acre price is expected to decline with parcel size due 
to the large number of potential buyers for small parcels.  Compared to large parcels, a multitude 
of agricultural, residential, and commercial opportunities exist for small farmland parcels 
(Guiling et al., 2009).  Borrowing constraints may also limit demand for large parcels (Miller, 
2006).  Finally, the rapid decay of farmland’s per-acre consumptive value contributes to higher 
values for small recreational farmland parcels (Pope, 1985).  Market influences favoring small 
parcel size are expected to overcome the agricultural advantages of large parcel size (see Figure 
4.4).  In this study, average sale size is defined as the average transferred acreage for parcels 
passing the previously-discussed IDOR data screens for a given county and year.  A negative 
relationship between parcel size (SIZE) and per-acre farmland price is predicted.   
It is well established that farmland prices increase when farm incomes are high.  This 
relationship is partially based on an income effect felt by potential farmland buyers (Dovring, 
1977).  In short, farmland buyers become more aggressive when their financial means increase, 
thereby driving strong farmland prices.  An income effect is also pertinent for nonagricultural 
buyers of farmland.  In this study, a county-level per capita income variable is used to account 
for the purchasing power of local residents.  The yearly per capita income data used in this study 
were calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Like farmland prices, per capita income 
figures were CPI-adjusted.  Because the income effect is expected to drive farmland prices 
upward, a positive coefficient is hypothesized for per capita income (INCOME). 
The six explanatory variables discussed previously form the relatively parsimonious 
hedonic model utilized in this study.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, recreational sales were a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 At the height of §1031 exchange activity, high demand for large parcels may have stemmed partially from §1031 
buyers’ desire to acquire considerable farmland through a minimal number of transactions (ISPFMRA, 2005). 
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notable component of Illinois’ strong farmland market from 2000 to 2010.  Recreational 
opportunities are notoriously difficult to measure.  A popular measure of natural resource 
amenities is a six-category metric devised by McGranahan (1999).  McGranahan’s index 
describes a county’s amenity level based on its average January temperature, average sunny days 
in January, average July temperature, average July humidity, topography, and total water area.  
Many of these variables are either irrelevant to Illinois or lack the necessary intrastate variation 
to meaningfully explain recreational opportunities in Illinois.  Accordingly, to measure 
recreational value’s impact on Illinois farmland from 2000 to 2010, a state-specific recreational 
amenity index was constructed based on three relevant factors: topography, water cover, and 
deer harvests.  Topography data were taken from the U.S. Geological Survey’s 21-point land 
surface topography code.  Water data were obtained from a 1996 geographic information system 
(GIS) survey conducted by the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR).  Water cover 
was defined as the share of a county’s total area covered by lakes, rivers, or streams.  IDNR deer 
harvest data were used to calculate a county’s total deer harvest per square mile.  While the 
topography and water data were fixed through time, deer harvests were calculated as a three-year 
moving average.17   
Similar to McGranahan’s measure, this study’s recreation index was calculated as the 
sum of a county’s recreational variable z-scores.18  To facilitate logarithmic transformations, the 
index was scaled so that all values are greater than or equal to one.  Figure 4.11 displays county-
level recreational amenity index data from 2010.  Although exact index values vary temporally 
based on deer harvests, there was relatively little change in index values during the 2000 to 2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A three-year moving average was utilized for deer harvests in order to reflect temporal changes in popular hunting 
areas and minimize the impact of year-to-year randomness in deer harvests.   
18 Z-scores were calculated on an annual basis using Illinois data only. 
 49  
	  
period.  As Figure 4.11 shows, recreational amenity index values were highest in southern and 
western Illinois.  This geographic pattern corresponds with ISPFMRA reports about the state’s 
most active recreational farmland markets.  Based on anecdotal evidence from the 2000 to 2010 
period, the recreational amenity index is expected to positively impact farmland prices.  
Summary statistics for the recreational amenity index (RECINDEX) variable are included in 
Table 4.4. 
The relationships between this model’s explanatory variables are summarized in Tables 
4.6 and 4.7.19  These tables reveal that moderately strong correlations exist between several 
explanatory variables.  Some of the larger correlations are rather unavoidable.  For instance, 
northern Illinois counties near Chicago contain higher quality farmland than southern Illinois 
counties near St. Louis.  Similarly, it is generally true that decreased proximity to Chicago entails 
increased proximity to St. Louis.  High collinearity among explanatory variables can make it 
difficult to disentangle the true effects of different explanatory variables.  However, the 
correlations displayed in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are not large enough to jeopardize the estimation 
process through extreme collinearity.  Auxilliary regressions involving this model’s explanatory 
variables also fail to raise significant concerns regarding collinearity. 
 
4.3  Empirical Model 
In previous sections, the theoretical context and explanatory variables of this study’s 
hedonic farmland price model were outlined.  Beyond these fundamentals of the hedonic model, 
a host of details regarding the estimation process must be considered.  This section explores the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The correlation matrices in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are based on logarithmic transformations of this study’s 
explanatory variables because this study’s empirical model is estimated in logarithms. 
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panel estimators, spatial representation, and functional form best suited to this study’s hedonic 
model of farmland prices. 
As spatial data and statistical software have become more accessible in recent years, 
acknowledging spatial relationships between data has become increasingly requisite in many 
econometric applications (Anselin, 2002).  Spatial modeling has also become an integral part of 
Illinois farmland price and cash rent models (Huang, et al., 2006; Woodard, 2010).  Figure 4.1 
reveals noticeable spatial clustering in Illinois farmland prices.  An oft-used diagnostic technique 
for spatial dependence was devised by Moran (1950).  Moran’s I test measures the extent to 
which a variable’s spatial distribution differs from a perfectly random pattern.20  As Table 4.8 
shows, Moran’s I test indicates considerable positive spatial autocorrelation among county-level 
farmland prices. 
Spatial dependence can seriously complicate the estimation process.  Spatial 
autocorrelation is “the coincidence of value similarity with locational similarity” (Anselin, 
1999).  It exists when the moment condition: 
(4.5) Cov(yi , yj) = E(yi , yj) – E(yi)*E(yj) ≠ 0 for i ≠ j 
is satisfied.  In the presence of spatial autocorrelation, ordinary least squares estimates may be 
biased and standard errors may be underestimated, thereby compromising both coefficient 
estimates and the significance tests pertaining to them (Anselin, 1988).  The Moran’s I test 
results shown in Table 4.8 warn that spatial autocorrelation is a pressing concern in the data 
studied here.  To combat problems posed by spatial dependencies, alternative estimation 
techniques are necessary.  Assuming normal errors, maximum likelihood estimation is a 
preferable substitute for ordinary least squares estimation because it is capable of consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  According to Moran’s I test, a perfectly random spatial distribution is similar to that of a checkerboard.	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estimating the spatial and slope coefficients of a spatial regression model (Ord, 1975).  
Accordingly, maximum likelihood is used to estimate this study’s spatial regression model. 
The spatial error model and the spatial lag model are the two basic spatial regression 
forms.  The spatial error model incorporates spatial weighting within a regression model’s error 
term.  In vector notation, when regressing a dependent variable, y, on explanatory variables, X, 
the spatial error model can be expressed as: 
(4.6)     y  = Xβ+ ρWε + u , 
where β is a vector of slope coefficients corresponding to the vector of explanatory variables, ! 
is a spatial autoregressive parameter, W is a spatial weights matrix defining spatial relationships 
between observations, ε is a vector of error terms for other observations, and  u is a vector of 
uncorrelated error terms.  By allowing for spatial relationships among error components, the 
spatial error model acknowledges that spatially-clustered omitted variables may play an 
important role in the estimation process.  In contrast, the spatial lag model accounts for spatial 
dependence by adding a spatially-weighted dependent variable to the underlying regression 
model.  The spatial lag model can be expressed as: 
(4.7) y  = ρWy + Xβ+ u , 
where u is a vector of traditional (non-spatial) error terms and other variables are defined as 
above.  In the spatial lag model, the spatial autoregressive parameter measures the expected 
change in a dependent variable due to spatially-weighted changes in other dependent variables.  
This spatial interaction is more direct than the relationship implied by the spatial error model.   
In the case of farmland prices, a spatial lag model may be used to represent the strong 
localization of farmland markets.  Farmland buyers typically have strong locational preferences, 
so price shocks in one area are likely to influence nearby areas (Baylis, et al., 2011).  According 
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to Patton and McErlean (2002), “Property owners, prospective buyers, real estate agencies, tax 
assessors and others base their estimates of values of agricultural land on observed sales in the 
vicinity.”  Similar logic underpins spatial lag models of residential real estate (Can and 
Megbolugbe, 1997).  The spatial lag model is also attractive because, as Huang et al. (2006) 
argue, the spatial error model’s pertinence is minimal if a model’s explanatory variables account 
for the fundamental determinants of farmland prices.  For these reasons, the spatial lag model is a 
theoretically desirable model for the hedonic analysis undertaken herein.  
In order to implement any spatial model, an exogenous spatial weighting matrix must be 
defined.  A plethora of weighting schemes exist, based on criteria such as contiguity, distance 
decay, and regional blocks (Anselin, 2002).  Since it is both widely used and easily interpretable 
relative to other weighting schemes, a queen contiguity spatial weights matrix is employed in 
this study’s spatial model.  The queen contiguity criterion regards spatial entities as neighbors if 
they share a border or vertex.  A nonzero value was assigned to the element (wij) representing 
these neighbors within the spatial weights matrix (W).  Using the queen contiguity methodology, 
all of a county’s neighbors were weighted equally.  In this study, an N x N matrix was created to 
represent spatial contiguities between the N Illinois counties included in the sample.  Diagonal 
elements in the spatial weighting matrix were assigned zeros to prevent the circular logic of a 
county being regarded as its own neighbor.  Therefore: 
(4.8) wii = 0 
for a county i.  Another convention applied to the queen contiguity matrix was row 
standardization, meaning that weights were deflated so that each row sums to one.  That is: 
(4.9) wij  * = wijwijj   
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where  wij*  is the row-standardized weight.  Row standardization prevents a county’s quantity of 
neighbors from determining the total spatial influence to which it is subjected by the spatial lag 
model.  The queen contiguity matrix described above imposes structure on the spatial lag model 
outlined previously. 
A random effects structure is preferred for this study’s hedonic model of farmland prices.  
Even though a balanced panel of farmland prices is examined, fixed location effects are not 
optimal because they would negate the explanatory power of the variables for soil productivity, 
Chicago distance, and St. Louis distance.  Although these variables are time-invariant, they are 
centrally important to the hedonic model described above and are worthy of estimation.  Despite 
the fact that fixed location effects are undesirable, fixed time effects can be usefully applied to 
account for spatially-invariant temporal factors such as commodity prices, input costs, or interest 
rates.  While random effects panel estimation is of primary focus, fixed time effects provide a 
worthwhile robustness check in certain situations.   
Hedonic models do not require a specific functional form.  As a result, numerous forms 
have been used in hedonic farmland price models.  Hedonic functional forms are generally 
selected according to fit and interpretability.  Based on these criteria, a log-log functional form 
was chosen for this study’s model of farmland prices.  Because the dependent and explanatory 
variables are both transformed into logarithms, coefficient estimates from the log-log model can 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
The model resulting from this chapter’s discussion is a hedonic, spatial lag representation 
of Illinois farmland prices estimated using random effects and a log-log functional form.  
Building upon previous research on the IDOR data set, this model incorporates the parsimonious 
approach of Oltmans et al. (1988) and the spatial insights outlined by Huang et al. (2006).   
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Succinctly, the hedonic farmland model for county i at time t is: 
(4.10) ln(PRICEit) 
  =  ρWln(PRICEit) +  β1 + β2  ln(SPRi)+  β3  ln(POPDENit) + β4  ln(CHIDISTi)  
+  β5  ln(STLDISTi)+  β6  ln(INCOMEit) +   β7  ln(SIZEit) + uit . 
Regression results and discussion pertaining to this model are presented in the following chapter. 
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4.4  Tables and Figures  
 
Figure 4.1.  Illinois Farmland Prices by County, 2010 
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Figure 4.2.  Sale Prices and Parcel Sizes for Champaign County Farmland Transfers, 1995 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Illinois Farmland Prices, 1979-2010 
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Table 4.1.  Average Illinois Farmland Prices by Sale Size, 1979-2010 
 
 Acres 
 
Year 
 
10.00-
19.99 
20.00-
39.99 
40.00-
59.99 
60.00-
79.99 
80.00-
119.99 
120.00-
159.99 
160.00-
319.99 
 
320.00+ 
         
1979 $3,372.24 $1,950.99 $1,673.57 $1,992.41 $1,941.84 $1,649.30 $1,750.11 $1,090.18 
1980 $2,805.28 $1,977.44 $1,930.83 $1,841.32 $2,054.26 $1,895.41 $1,834.64 $1,420.55 
1981 $2,981.64 $1,948.77 $1,868.17 $2,068.36 $2,172.77 $2,060.73 $1,785.15 $1,242.78 
1982 $3,127.19 $1,974.12 $1,703.45 $1,781.87 $1,924.51 $1,636.40 $1,626.14 $1,728.01 
1983 $3,154.48 $1,796.96 $1,617.57 $1,581.17 $1,627.92 $1,714.42 $1,569.24 $1,177.26 
1984 $3,411.35 $1,933.80 $1,506.70 $1,603.15 $1,689.69 $1,455.89 $1,547.86 $1,531.14 
1985 $3,558.26 $1,891.57 $1,504.29 $1,468.76 $1,327.71 $1,170.13 $1,157.59 $1,737.09 
1986 $3,938.46 $1,809.89 $1,291.08 $1,290.22 $1,194.02 $1,167.33 $1,041.78 $1,303.44 
1987 $3,708.90 $1,896.84 $1,251.68 $1,036.00 $1,163.05 $1,051.40 $987.03 $1,040.42 
1988 $3,136.29 $1,893.42 $1,418.87 $1,516.01 $1,344.72 $1,283.72 $1,019.44 $1,067.49 
1989 $3,321.16 $1,889.33 $1,507.33 $1,497.99 $1,295.35 $1,319.58 $1,300.11 $1,246.71 
1990 $3,624.42 $1,953.44 $1,502.88 $1,402.91 $1,302.99 $1,393.96 $1,439.74 $1,419.33 
1991 $3,288.05 $1,852.10 $1,601.31 $1,415.94 $1,376.96 $1,312.74 $1,322.33 $1,257.72 
1992 $3,469.08 $1,802.49 $1,384.19 $1,429.72 $1,299.21 $1,162.10 $1,286.16 $1,693.10 
1993 $3,837.89 $2,219.32 $1,563.94 $1,479.76 $1,425.54 $1,424.52 $1,323.09 $1,066.93 
1994 $4,070.43 $2,180.22 $1,654.71 $1,463.26 $1,413.52 $1,557.62 $1,633.55 $1,201.17 
1995 $4,000.05 $2,367.49 $1,943.89 $1,638.27 $1,647.76 $1,616.35 $1,559.33 $1,225.67 
1996 $4,348.06 $2,545.52 $1,894.40 $1,941.01 $1,785.21 $1,964.90 $1,719.72 $1,542.35 
1997 $4,887.19 $2,721.70 $1,960.90 $2,187.59 $2,207.56 $2,068.02 $1,960.30 $1,321.21 
1998 $4,952.39 $2,918.30 $2,144.17 $2,187.02 $2,298.74 $1,911.89 $1,882.84 $1,632.96 
1999 $5,456.43 $3,373.72 $2,280.92 $2,256.24 $2,252.37 $2,589.88 $2,111.63 $2,332.63 
2000 $4,706.23 $3,208.47 $2,451.31 $2,501.71 $2,241.67 $2,415.25 $2,178.48 $1,893.71 
2001 $4,759.42 $3,065.58 $2,540.37 $2,722.69 $2,165.03 $2,241.38 $2,093.35 $1,966.41 
2002 $5,040.47 $3,326.01 $2,656.13 $2,661.06 $2,463.38 $2,233.99 $2,404.67 $1,718.77 
2003 $5,257.66 $3,484.85 $2,927.31 $2,936.96 $2,751.90 $2,684.76 $2,303.14 $2,123.33 
2004 $5,440.95 $3,701.07 $3,210.91 $3,199.83 $3,063.17 $2,828.87 $2,674.62 $2,810.39 
2005 $5,936.60 $4,329.80 $3,541.75 $3,841.44 $3,572.91 $3,608.15 $3,017.66 $3,019.48 
2006 $6,204.17 $4,353.92 $3,790.98 $3,852.84 $3,710.36 $3,780.87 $3,492.49 $3,477.44 
2007 $6,016.69 $4,253.57 $3,990.86 $3,939.52 $3,782.78 $3,774.59 $3,687.04 $3,544.09 
2008 $6,018.20 $4,644.50 $4,354.33 $4,371.90 $4,342.16 $4,167.86 $4,198.14 $3,452.45 
2009 $6,327.48 $4,664.31 $4,264.38 $4,438.60 $4,360.44 $3,920.75 $4,116.96 $3,792.59 
2010 $6,312.82 $4,778.40 $4,549.39 $4,655.55 $4,496.38 $4,683.35 $4,034.24 $3,562.24 
Source: IDOR 
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Figure 4.4.  Average Illinois Farmland Prices by Sale Size, 1979-2010 
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Table 4.2.  Share of Yearly Illinois Farmland Transactions by Sale Size, 1979-2010 
 
 Acres 
 
Year 
10.00-
19.99 
20.00-
39.99 
40.00-
59.99 
60.00-
79.99 
80.00-
119.99 
120.00-
159.99 
160.00-
319.99 
 
320.00+ 
         
1979 21.05% 22.33% 19.45% 9.50% 14.60% 5.20% 6.38% 1.49% 
1980 19.85% 20.17% 19.75% 9.01% 16.87% 6.44% 6.71% 1.20% 
1981 20.56% 22.34% 19.03% 9.61% 16.71% 4.77% 6.00% 0.98% 
1982 23.04% 21.89% 18.07% 9.14% 14.46% 5.52% 6.88% 1.00% 
1983 21.89% 23.41% 19.52% 9.07% 14.39% 4.56% 5.98% 1.19% 
1984 23.03% 21.77% 19.29% 9.19% 14.09% 5.35% 6.11% 1.16% 
1985 24.49% 19.91% 18.45% 8.73% 14.77% 5.13% 7.42% 1.09% 
1986 22.59% 21.04% 17.52% 9.32% 14.80% 5.91% 7.03% 1.79% 
1987 17.70% 21.67% 18.96% 9.65% 15.68% 6.37% 8.68% 1.29% 
1988 17.92% 21.99% 19.40% 9.52% 15.39% 6.41% 7.82% 1.54% 
1989 16.12% 21.69% 20.76% 9.34% 15.96% 6.69% 7.90% 1.54% 
1990 16.49% 19.81% 20.96% 10.81% 16.89% 5.91% 7.56% 1.58% 
1991 17.03% 21.55% 20.07% 9.62% 16.17% 6.33% 7.72% 1.51% 
1992 16.11% 22.48% 19.64% 10.12% 15.91% 5.96% 7.93% 1.85% 
1993 17.44% 21.38% 19.28% 9.74% 15.40% 6.35% 8.36% 2.04% 
1994 17.74% 22.99% 18.46% 9.37% 14.94% 6.17% 8.84% 1.48% 
1995 17.58% 23.09% 18.36% 10.00% 15.71% 6.25% 7.56% 1.46% 
1996 18.05% 20.87% 17.93% 10.02% 16.48% 7.02% 8.25% 1.39% 
1997 19.05% 22.06% 18.71% 9.75% 14.31% 6.55% 8.22% 1.35% 
1998 18.98% 21.02% 19.04% 10.69% 15.58% 6.35% 6.87% 1.49% 
1999 18.29% 21.93% 18.36% 10.71% 14.80% 6.80% 7.59% 1.52% 
2000 17.42% 20.31% 17.99% 10.90% 16.57% 7.24% 8.09% 1.48% 
2001 16.84% 20.97% 19.09% 10.13% 15.60% 7.76% 7.98% 1.61% 
2002 17.10% 20.61% 18.11% 10.55% 15.18% 7.02% 9.54% 1.89% 
2003 17.22% 20.63% 17.86% 10.65% 15.03% 7.67% 9.07% 1.86% 
2004 17.73% 21.17% 17.65% 10.45% 14.83% 7.26% 8.97% 1.93% 
2005 17.40% 21.25% 17.98% 10.94% 14.69% 7.55% 8.43% 1.77% 
2006 16.13% 21.05% 18.83% 10.67% 14.76% 7.37% 9.24% 1.94% 
2007 15.32% 20.82% 18.08% 11.19% 15.67% 8.02% 9.03% 1.86% 
2008 16.14% 21.51% 18.79% 11.48% 16.34% 6.54% 7.22% 1.98% 
2009 15.77% 20.75% 18.81% 11.00% 16.04% 7.56% 8.41% 1.67% 
2010 16.11% 22.24% 18.64% 11.40% 15.71% 7.11% 7.48% 1.31% 
Source: IDOR        
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Figure 4.5.  Average Illinois Farmland Sale Sizes and Farm Sizes, 1979-2010 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.  Average Illinois Farmland Prices by ISPFMRA Region, 1979-2010 
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Figure 4.7.  Average Illinois Farmland Prices by ISPFMRA Region, 1979-2010 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Summary Statistics for Variables, 1979-2010 
 
Variable 
 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
 
PRICE 
 
2,976 
 
1,307.51 
 
945.05 
 
180.16 
 
11,650.57 
 
SPR 
 
93 
 
71.88 
 
14.58 
 
41.61 
 
93.56 
 
POPDEN 
 
2,976 
 
82.12 
 
93.21 
 
11.70 
 
576.06 
 
CHIDIST 
 
93 
 
185.74 
 
74.9 
 
40.92 
 
335.04 
 
STLDIST 
 
93 
 
132.76 
 
62.05 
 
11.28 
 
277.52 
 
SIZE 
 
2,976 
 
64.08 
 
20.80 
 
10.00 
 
209.00 
 
INCOME 
 
2,976 
 
12,901.47 
 
2,259.53 
 
6,632.56 
 
20,548.25 
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Table 4.4.  Summary Statistics for Variables, 2000-2010 
 
Variable 
 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
 
PRICE 
 
1,078 
 
1,456.34 
 
1,223.14 
 
427.65 
 
11,650.57 
 
SPR 
 
98 
 
72.044 
 
14.30 
 
41.61 
 
93.56 
 
POPDEN 
 
1,078 
 
90.20 
 
118.64 
 
11.75 
 
811.17 
 
CHIDIST 
 
98 
 
182.01 
 
75.75 
 
28.22 
 
335.04 
 
STLDIST 
 
98 
 
136.33 
 
63.85 
 
11.28 
 
277.52 
 
SIZE 
 
1,078 
 
69.16 
 
18.57 
 
29.56 
 
158.04 
 
INCOME 
 
1,078 
 
14,693.27 
 
2,015.34 
 
9,586.99 
 
20,548.25 
 
RECINDEX 
 
 
1,078 
 
3.83 
 
2.09 
 
1.00 
 
11.10 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8.  Soil Productivity and Returns 
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Figure 4.9.  Illinois Soil Productivity Ratings by County 
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Table 4.5.  Descriptions and Expected Signs for Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Exp. Sign 
 
SPR County-average soil productivity rating from FBFM surveys. (+) 
POPDEN Mid-year county population estimate divided by county's land area. (+) 
CHIDIST Straight-line distance from county's geographic centroid to Chicago. (–) 
STLDIST Straight-line distance from county's geographic centroid to St. Louis. (–) 
SIZE Acre-weighted county-average transfer size for sales passing data screens. (–) 
INCOME County per capita income adjusted for inflation using CPI (1982-1984=100). (+) 
RECINDEX Sum of county z-scores for topography, water area, and deer harvest/sq. mile. (+) 
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Figure 4.10.  Illinois Population Densities by County, 2010 
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Figure 4.11.  Illinois Recreation Amenity Index Values by County, 2010 
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Table 4.6.  Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, 1979-2010 
 ln(SPR) ln(POPDEN) ln(CHIDIST) ln(STLDIST) ln(SIZE) ln(INCOME) 
ln(SPR) 1.000 0.249 -0.682 0.349 0.289 0.444 
ln(POPDEN) 0.249 1.000 -0.363 0.040 -0.129 0.394 
ln(CHIDIST) -0.682 -0.363 1.000 -0.673 -0.182 -0.462 
ln(STLDIST) 0.349 0.040 -0.673 1.000 0.195 0.165 
ln(SIZE) 0.289 -0.129 -0.182 0.195 1.000 0.179 
ln(INCOME) 0.444 0.394 -0.462 0.165 0.179 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7.  Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, 2000-2010 
 ln(SPR) ln(POPDEN) ln(CHIDIST) ln(STLDIST) ln(SIZE) ln(INCOME) ln(RECINDEX) 
ln(SPR) 1.000 0.259 -0.656 0.344 0.441 0.539 -0.463 
ln(POPDEN) 0.259 1.000 -0.448 0.066 -0.126 0.447 -0.098 
ln(CHIDIST) -0.656 -0.448 1.000 -0.670 -0.320 -0.530 0.512 
ln(STLDIST) 0.344 0.066 -0.670 1.000 0.327 0.180 -0.381 
ln(SIZE) 0.441 -0.126 -0.320 0.327 1.000 0.135 -0.177 
ln(INCOME) 0.539 0.447 -0.530 0.180 0.135 1.000 -0.300 
ln(RECINDEX) -0.463 -0.098 0.512 -0.381 -0.177 -0.300 1.000 
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Table 4.8.  Moran’s I Test Statistics, 1979-2010 
 
Year 
 
Moran's I 1 
 
Z-Score (Randomization) 
 
 
P-Value 2 
1979 0.463 5.148 0.000 
1980 0.589 6.520 0.000 
1981 0.552 6.104 0.000 
1982 0.405 4.536 0.000 
1983 0.327 3.687 0.000 
1984 0.490 5.431 0.000 
1985 0.391 4.362 0.000 
1986 0.345 3.92 0.000 
1987 0.309 3.483 0.000 
1988 0.432 4.899 0.000 
1989 0.389 4.511 0.000 
1990 0.332 3.971 0.000 
1991 0.462 5.259 0.000 
1992 0.532 6.055 0.000 
1993 0.514 5.801 0.000 
1994 0.413 4.693 0.000 
1995 0.369 4.268 0.000 
1996 0.304 3.767 0.000 
1997 0.325 3.956 0.000 
1998 0.536 6.237 0.000 
1999 0.289 3.812 0.000 
2000 0.340 4.006 0.000 
2001 0.223 2.814 0.002 
2002 0.298 3.726 0.000 
2003 0.190 2.549 0.005 
2004 0.407 4.713 0.000 
2005 0.427 5.031 0.000 
2006 0.435 5.096 0.000 
2007 0.578 6.668 0.000 
2008 0.383 4.588 0.000 
2009 0.485 5.589 0.000 
2010 0.361 4.110 0.000 
  
1.  When no spatial autocorrelation is present, Moran's I is approximately 0 (exact value depends on sample size).  Perfect 
negative autocorrelation and perfect positive autocorrelation result in Is of -1 and 1, respectively. 
 2.  P-values are based on Ho: county farmland prices are spatially independent. 
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CHAPTER 5    RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses regression results from the hedonic model of farmland prices laid 
out in Chapter 4.  It begins by summarizing the hedonic model’s application to IDOR farmland 
transfer data from 1979 to 2010.  These results provide a test of the hedonic model’s 
reasonableness and serve as a point of comparison for other estimates.  The primary focus of this 
study is farmland prices from 2000 to 2010.  As a result, the hedonic model’s application to data 
from that period is examined in great detail.  Considerable analysis and discussion are devoted to 
temporal changes in farmland price determinants within the 2000 to 2010 time frame.  
Regression results from a hedonic model incorporating the recreational amenity index are also 
discussed.  Lastly, this chapter reports regression results from a parcel-level hedonic model that 
checks the robustness of this study’s hedonic model and offers a unique perspective on farmland 
price determination in Illinois.  
Table 5.1 displays the results of the hedonic farmland price model’s application to Illinois 
data from 1979 to 2010.  In addition to the results of the random effects spatial lag model, 
findings from four other specifications are reported for comparative purposes.21  Each 
specification regresses CPI-adjusted farmland prices on the explanatory variables summarized in 
Table 4.1.  Because a traditional R2 measure is not applicable to the spatial lag model, goodness 
of fit is measured by the squared correlation between predicted and observed values of the 
dependent variable (Anselin, 1992).  According to this pseudo R2, the hedonic model explains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The other specifications estimated are pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), non-spatial random effects OLS, 
random effects maximum likelihood (ML) spatial error, and fixed time effects ML spatial lag.  Pooled OLS is 
perhaps the most elementary and common estimation approach in econometrics.  A panel estimator is applied to 
OLS through the non-spatial random effects specification.  The spatial error specification offers the theoretical 
counterpart to the spatial lag model that sits at this chapter’s heart.  The fixed time effects specification exploits the 
temporal dimension of the farmland price panel to control for certain unmodeled farmland price determinants. 
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Illinois farmland prices relatively well.  The spatial correlation coefficients are significant in all 
three models that account for spatial relationships, demonstrating the strength of spatial ties 
within the data.   
Based on regression coefficient magnitudes, soil productivity rating was the largest 
determinant of Illinois farmland prices during the 1979 to 2010 period.  This result holds for all 
five specifications in Table 5.1, indicating that it is not driven solely by the spatial lag estimator.  
The explanatory importance of soil productivity is intuitively appealing because it verifies the 
fundamental linkage between agricultural productivity and farmland prices.  Chicago distance 
also had a major influence on Illinois farmland prices from 1979 to 2010.  All explanatory 
variables assume their predicted signs across each of the five specifications.  Furthermore, with 
the exception of the St. Louis distance variable in the random effects spatial lag model, all of the 
coefficients listed in Table 5.1 are significant at the one percent level.   
Because the hedonic model referred to in Table 5.1 is relatively parsimonious, there are 
undoubtedly some omitted temporal variables that have a fairly uniform impact across space.  
While short panels remove much of the heterogeneity in these temporal effects, year-specific 
effects may seriously muddy results from longer panels like the 32-year time series analyzed in 
Table 5.1.  A fixed time effects model is estimated to account for year-specific effects.  
Compared to its random effects counterpart, the fixed time effects spatial lag model assigns 
much greater deterministic importance to per capita income and much less deterministic 
importance to population density.  However, the fixed time effects model does not lessen the 
significance or change the sign of a single variable.  In summary, while the fixed time effects 
model highlights the importance of unmodeled year-to-year effects, it supports the findings of 
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the other specifications summarized in Table 5.1 and validates the rationale underpinning the 
hedonic model. 
This study is particularly interested in examining the Illinois farmland market from 2000 
to 2010.  Because it is reasonable to expect farmland price determinants to change through time, 
the 32-year panel in Table 5.1 is also analyzed using the hedonic model augmented by 
differential slope variables representing the 2000 to 2010 period.  The differential slope variables 
are simply explanatory variables from the hedonic model multiplied by a dummy that is equal to 
one from 2000 to 2010.   
The significance levels of the differential slope coefficients create a de facto Chow test 
for coefficient differences between time periods.  The results of the hedonic model with 
differential slope variables reveal several inter-period coefficient changes that are significant at 
the one percent level.  During the 2000 to 2010 period, the slope coefficients for Chicago 
distance and St. Louis distance experience strong increases in magnitude.  Major premiums for 
nearness to Chicago or St. Louis are explained by the widespread, lucrative conversion of 
farmland to residential use, which was especially common just after the turn of the century.  
Conversely, the differential slope coefficient for soil productivity rating is negative, suggesting 
that soil productivity was a less important driver of aggregate farmland price trends from 2000 to 
2010 than previously.  These findings motivate deeper study of the 2000 to 2010 period. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Illinois farmland prices were pushed by a number of strong 
currents between 2000 and 2010.  Transitional farmland demand, commodity prices, and farm 
incomes all underwent considerable change from the beginning to the end of the period.  To 
study these dynamics, differential slope coefficients are once again added to the hedonic model, 
which is now focused on data from 2000 to 2010 only.  These differential slope variables only 
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have a value from 2006 to 2010, allowing for more accurate estimation of farmland determinants 
in each period and providing significance tests of any inter-period changes.  Although splitting 
the data beginning in 2006 is somewhat arbitrary and simplistic, it is justified based on trends in 
the factors cited above.22  Table 5.2 displays regression results from the new specification of the 
hedonic model. 
The most basic dichotomy in farmland price determination is between agricultural 
influences and nonagricultural influences.  Hedonic analysis of Illinois farmland prices from 
2000 to 2010 reinforces this point.  The non-differential coefficients in Table 5.2 provide insights 
specific to the 2000 to 2005 period.  In the random effects spatial lag specification, the non-
differential coefficients for Chicago distance and soil productivity are greater than the 
coefficients of any other variables.  Although differences in scaling make it difficult to directly 
compare the coefficients for Chicago distance and soil productivity, it is undeniable that 
farmland’s sensitivity to changes in Chicago distance was extremely high from 2000 to 2005.  
The large premium for farmland near Chicago during the early 2000s makes sense given the 
massive demand for transitional farmland at that time.  The strong influence of nonagricultural 
factors on farmland prices is also visible in the large coefficients for St. Louis distance and 
population density.  With the exception of per capita income, all non-differential slope 
coefficients are strongly significant and of the predicted sign.  All told, the results of the hedonic 
farmland price model illustrate that population pressures played a leading role in the Illinois 
farmland market from 2000 to 2005. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  No clear “break point” exists for trends in agricultural and nonagricultural determinants of farmland prices. 
Arguments can be made for regarding 2006, 2007, or even 2008 as the first year of the “new era.”  Running 
regressions for models with different “break points” and examining the trends discussed in Chapter 2 led to the 
model displayed in Figure 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 indicates that Illinois farmland price dynamics changed markedly late in the 
2000 to 2010 period.  The differential slope coefficient for Chicago distance reveals a diminished 
premium for proximity to the city from 2006 to 2010.  This finding is significant at the five 
percent level in all but one of the specifications in Table 5.2.  The reduced deterministic 
importance of population pressure during the 2006 to 2010 period is also exhibited by the 
differential slope coefficient for population density, which is negative and significant at the one 
percent level in all of Table 5.2’s specifications.  The magnitudes and significance levels of these 
differential slope coefficients are explained by the mid-decade downturn in the transitional 
farmland market.  There is a lack of significant change in the St. Louis distance coefficient.  This 
result may be explained by the fact that transitional farmland sales were less influential in the St. 
Louis area than the Chicago area (see Figure 2.14). 
As indicated by the differential slope coefficient for soil productivity, agricultural factors 
were increasingly important determinants of farmland prices during the 2006 to 2010 period.  
The enhanced influence of soil productivity in the latter portion of the 2000 to 2010 period may 
reflect trends in commodity prices, farm incomes, and cash rents.  Beginning in 2006, corn and 
soybean prices shifted higher thanks to strong demand.  As Figure 2.6 shows, higher commodity 
prices contributed to elevated farm incomes and cash rents from 2006 onward.  Although these 
changes benefitted farms of any productivity level, they were especially advantageous for high 
productivity farms where price increases were multiplied by high yields.  
Urban influence on farmland prices was relatively high throughout the 2000 to 2010 
period.  Nevertheless, based on the results in Table 5.2, 2006 to 2010 could be described as 
something of a “return to normalcy” in the Illinois farmland market.  Compared to the previous 
six years, agricultural farmland price determinants increased in importance and population-
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related farmland price determinants decreased in importance, restoring a more normal historical 
balance between the two.  This reversion to relatively typical farmland market dynamics makes 
the 2000 to 2005 period appear truly aberrant.  Indeed, it seems that the early 2000s housing 
bubble led to another bubble in the transitional farmland market. 
Actual 2006 to 2010 coefficients for the hedonic farmland model’s variables can be 
obtained by adding the differential and non-differential slope coefficients together.  According to 
random effects spatial lag estimates, from 2006 to 2010, farmland price’s elasticity to increases 
in soil productivity rating (0.619) is nearly the same as its elasticity to decreases in Chicago 
distance (0.731).  Although the coefficients for soil productivity and Chicago distance are of 
relatively similar magnitudes from 2006 to 2010, they impact farmland prices in different 
manners.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 use the results from Table 5.2 to show how farmland prices at the 
urban fringe are influenced by both agricultural and nonagricultural factors.  As Figure 5.1 
shows, the premium for proximity to Chicago grows dramatically as the city becomes nearer and 
nearer.23  Soil productivity, on the other hand, has a much steadier impact on farmland prices.  
Even though these results are a product of the log-log functional form used in the estimation 
process, they are intuitively reasonable.  Figure 5.2 contains a similar depiction of farmland 
prices near St. Louis.  Although proximity to St. Louis does not boost farmland prices to the 
extent that proximity to Chicago does, the preceding analysis of Figure 5.1 is also applicable to 
Figure 5.2.   
It is clear that a large locational value is attached to farmland near urban areas.  Based on 
results from the hedonic model, the predicted 2010 sale price of Will County farmland is 60.2 
percent higher than the predicted sale price of otherwise identical farmland located 100 miles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 hold all variables except soil productivity and Chicago or St. Louis distance constant at 
average 2010 levels in order to calculate spatial lag estimates of farmland prices.  Although this method is somewhat 
unrealistic and simplistic, it usefully isolates the effects of soil productivity and Chicago or St. Louis distance. 
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from Chicago.24  This premium is 42.4 percent for farmland in McHenry County.  The price-
boosting influence of urban proximity indicates that many transitional farmland sales are 
occurring and that these transitional opportunities are being capitalized into the prices of 
farmland that has not yet been converted to nonagricultural use.  In the language of equation 
(3.3), empirical results suggest that returns to converted farmland (NRt) are high and that the 
expected time of nonagricultural conversion (T) is not distant for much urban-influenced 
farmland.  For Will County, McHenry County, and a host of other counties at the urban fringe, 
the financial benefit of transitioning farmland to nonagricultural use is often sufficient to cause 
conversion.  It is no surprise that between 2002 and 2007, Will County and McHenry County lost 
16.8 percent and 7.7 percent of their land in farms, respectively (USDA, 2009a).   
The results in Table 5.2 have serious implications for agriculture at the urban fringe.  The 
substantial premium attached to urban proximity reveals the financial lengths to which farmland 
preservation groups must go in order to keep urban-influenced farmland from being developed. 
Strong returns to farmland conversion also determine the type of farm operations that persist near 
urban areas.  Specifically, traditional row crop operations may not be feasible in urban-
influenced areas if they offer returns insufficient to prevent conversion to nonagricultural use.  
However, as suggested by von Thünen’s theory, smaller operations growing specialty or high 
value crops may survive because they offer strong per-acre returns and are uniquely positioned to 
take advantage of demand from urban consumers (Heimlich and Barnard, 1992).  Finally, it 
should be noted that the aggregate trends described above are also applicable at the micro level, 
where they simply become more intricate.  In other words, even though all farmland on the urban 
fringe faces some conversion pressure, the exact amount of pressure on an individual parcel is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Predicted values were calculated using random effects spatial lag estimates. 
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determined by a bevy of factors such as development plans, road locations, and zoning 
restrictions. 
Another key theme in the Illinois farmland market from 2000 to 2010 was skyrocketing 
recreational farmland prices.  To assess recreational value’s contribution to county-level 
farmland prices, the model estimated in Table 5.2 is supplemented with the recreational amenity 
index described in Chapter 4.  A differential slope variable for recreational amenity index from 
2006 to 2010 is also introduced to measure whether recreational farmland was less attractive 
during that time frame, as annual ISPFMRA reports suggest.  Table 5.3 displays the results of 
this model.  Comparing pseudo R2 measures between Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 reveals that the 
recreational amenity index adds essentially nothing to the hedonic model’s overall explanatory 
power.  Indeed, the recreational amenity index’s coefficient is statistically insignificant in all five 
specifications in Table 5.3.  Differential slope coefficients for the recreational amenity index 
from 2006 to 2010 are also statistically insignificant.  Identical models estimated for counties in 
the southern and western parts of the state fail to assign deterministic importance to the 
recreational amenity index.25  Similarly, hedonic models utilizing other constructions and 
combinations of the variables used in the recreational amenity index do not reveal patterns 
different from those described above.  In short, according to this study’s definition of 
recreational amenities, recreation did not meaningfully impact county-level Illinois farmland 
prices during the 2000 to 2010 period. 
There are a number of plausible explanations for the lack of recreational influence on 
county-level farmland prices.  First, county-level aggregation is fairly unwieldy for measuring 
recreational value.  Suitability for hunting or water recreation is distributed extremely unevenly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Counties analyzed were those south of Interstate 70 and those in ISPFMRA regions 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, or 10. 
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within a county.  Therefore, it is difficult to identify accurate and meaningful measures of 
recreational value that are applicable to all farmland sales within a county.  Second, recreational 
sales often involve land that is either marginal or essentially unusable for agricultural purposes.  
As recorded by the ISPFMRA, average sale prices for recreational tracts are typically equal to or 
just below average sale prices for “fair” tracts.26  It may be difficult to detect the fact that 
recreational value is lifting sale prices for certain very poor farm tracts into equality with slightly 
less poor farmland.  This issue is difficult to measure on the aggregate level and may be easier to 
investigate on an individual sale basis.  Finally, although memorable when they bring high 
prices, recreational sales are a relatively small fraction of total farmland sales, particularly in 
northeast and east-central Illinois.27  The findings in Table 5.3 do nothing to refute anecdotal and 
survey evidence of strong recreational farmland market from 2000 to 2010.  However, these 
results serve as a reminder that recreational sales are not a major driver of aggregate Illinois 
farmland prices. 
County-aggregated IDOR data are highly useful for composing a long, geographically-
balanced panel of farmland prices.  That said, matching county-level farmland prices with 
county-level explanatory variables is often difficult.  This complication may influence regression 
results because county-level regressions measure a different sort of variation than do similar 
parcel-level regressions.  To gain a new perspective on Illinois farmland prices, a hedonic model 
is applied to parcel-level transaction data. 
Detailed data on individual Illinois farmland transactions are available from the 
ISPFMRA.  Every year, ISPFMRA members collect data on individual farmland sales for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 According to the ISPFMRA, “fair” tracts are average or poor in soil productivity, transportation access, market 
access, and topography. 
 
27 ISPFMRA reports indicate that eight to ten percent of Illinois farmland buyers from 2001 to 2006 had recreational 
motives. 
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inclusion in the group’s farmland value reports.  Despite being nonrandom and non-
comprehensive, the ISPFMRA’s “super sample” contains excellent parcel-specific information 
on price, soil productivity rating, acreage, and tillable acreage for select farmland sales.  A 
hedonic farmland price model is estimated using parcel-level ISPFMRA data from 2001 to 
2010.28  The hedonic model used in this case is simply the hedonic model used for county-level 
analysis plus a percent-tillable variable, which is included to paint a more detailed picture of a 
parcel’s agricultural usefulness.  All variables except sale price, parcel size, soil productivity 
rating, and percent-tillable remain county-level measures.29  The ISPFMRA sample is composed 
of farmland classified as “excellent”, “good”, “average”, or “fair.”  Although the ISPFMRA 
records information for “recreational” sales and “transitional” sales, these sales were excluded to 
avoid imposing arbitrary nonagricultural influence on the sample.  Due to year-to-year variation 
in both the size and spatial distribution of the ISPFMRA sample, cross-sectional estimation is 
more feasible than panel estimation.  Estimation by annual cross sections also eliminates the 
consideration of fixed time effects.  To account for spatial relationships among the data, a 
modified queen contiguity matrix was constructed where observations are regarded as neighbors 
if they are in identical or bordering counties.  Results for OLS and spatial lag specifications of 
the parcel-level hedonic model are displayed in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, respectively.  Figures 
5.3 and 5.4 capture the magnitudes of coefficient estimates from the parcel-level regressions. 
There are two major takeaways from the parcel-level regressions.  First, the large 
coefficients attached to soil productivity rating and percent-tillable indicate agricultural 
productivity’s paramount importance in determining farmland prices.  These coefficients confirm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Detailed parcel-level data were not available in ISPFMRA publications prior to 2001. 
29 Productivity ratings for ISPFMRA from 2001 to 2003 are based on Circular 1156 and productivity ratings from 
2004 to 2010 are based on Bulletin 811.  For comparability to soil productivity measures used elsewhere in this 
study, all productivity ratings were converted to the 100-point scale developed by Grano (1963). 
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the most basic tenet of farmland valuation: agricultural productivity and farmland prices are 
strongly correlated.  Soil productivity rating’s coefficients in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are larger than 
corresponding coefficients from county-level regressions.  This is not surprising given that 
ISPFMRA price and productivity measures are exactly matched and the ISPFMRA sample is 
limited to a relatively narrow class of farmland.  Altogether, it makes perfect sense that soil 
productivity and tillability are of major importance in parcel-level regressions.  The second key 
insight is that parcel-level regression results meet sign expectations for individual explanatory 
variables and confirm the explanatory power of the hedonic model.30  As Figures 5.3 and 5.4 
demonstrate, the magnitudes of most regression coefficients are relatively stable through time.  
Compared to county-level analysis, the influences of nonagricultural explanatory variables are 
somewhat muted in parcel-level analysis, likely due to the strong agricultural orientation of the 
ISPFMRA sample.   
Although analyzing year-to-year changes in regression coefficients is somewhat 
unadvisable, there is a noticeable decline in the premium for Chicago proximity after 2006.   
A slight downward trend in the magnitude of the St. Louis distance coefficient is also visible.  
These findings corroborate anecdotal and empirical evidence of flagging urban influence on 
farmland prices late in the decade.  Hedonic models substituting parcel-specific cash rents for 
soil productivity rating and percent-tillable also ascribe much explanatory importance to 
agricultural productivity.  Although these results provide a confirmative robustness test of the 
parcel-level hedonic model, they are not reported because the ISPFMRA cash rent sample is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The notable exception to this rule is the coefficient for parcel size, which is either statistically insignificant or of 
miniscule magnitude in each year estimated.  The ISPFMRA sample is composed of farmland parcels of relatively 
uniform, large size.  These sample characteristics mitigate the premium for small parcel size.  
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smaller, shorter, and more spatially clustered than the full ISPFMRA sample that was used to 
develop the results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
Parcel-level regression results add emphasis to a point that was already made by the 
county-level IDOR data: soil quality is a critical determinant of farmland prices.  This truism is 
equivalent to noting that factors influencing farmland profitability also influence farmland prices.  
As mentioned previously, a rising tide of commodity prices lifts all farm incomes but is 
particularly beneficial for farms with the highest quality farmland.  Accordingly, the premium 
for high productivity farmland increases along with commodity prices.  This idea dates back to 
Ricardo (see Figure 3.1).  As an additional source of farm income, government payments play a 
unique role in determining the relationship between soil quality and farmland price.  The exact 
effects of government programs on farmland prices are variable.  For instance, post-1996 income 
support has been defined by its ties to historical production, which maintain a theoretical linkage 
between farmland productivity, farm incomes, and farmland prices.   This does not have to be the 
case, however, as payments from the Conservation Reserve Program are of minor relevance to 
owners of high quality farmland but offer potentially important income to owners of low quality 
farmland.  The examples cited above are not part of a prescriptive or comprehensive analysis of 
farm incomes and farmland prices.  Rather, they indicate that a dynamic collection of factors 
shapes farmland productivity’s precise influence on farmland price. 
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5.1  Tables and Figures 
Table 5.1.  Regression Results for Hedonic Farmland Price Model, 1979-2010 
  
OLS 
(Pooled) 
 
OLS 
(Non-spatial 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial Lag 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial 
Error RE) 
 
ML  
(Spatial Lag 
Time FE) 
 
 
ln(SPR) 
 
0.881 
 
0.899 
 
0.960 
 
0.839 
 
0.679 
 (17.82)*** (8.28)*** (2.98)*** (7.31)*** (17.42)*** 
ln(POPDEN) 0.142 0.214 0.516 0.181 0.128 
 (12.87)*** (9.16)*** (6.67)*** (7.77)*** (15.62)*** 
ln(CHIDIST) -0.542 -0.490 -0.526 -0.532 -0.467 
 (18.34)*** (7.45)*** (2.82)*** (7.92)*** (20.58)*** 
ln(STLDIST) -0.160 -0.136 -0.129 -0.161 -0.144 
 (8.96)*** (3.39)*** (1.26) (3.79)*** (11.03)*** 
ln(SIZE) -0.249 -0.208 -0.319 -0.119 -0.158 
 (10.08)*** (8.05)*** (8.41)*** (6.44)*** (8.48)*** 
ln(INCOME) 0.275 0.150 0.136 0.199 0.481 
 (5.42)*** (2.72)*** (2.78)*** (2.73)*** (8.19)*** 
Spatial coeff. (ρ)  0.562 0.579 0.143 
   (44.37)*** (45.18)*** (8.93)*** 
 
 
Pseudo R2 [corr(y,y)2]  0.5562  0.5503  0.6357  0.6216  0.6154 
Observations 2,976 2,976 2,976 2,976 2,976 
Counties 93 93 93 93 93 
 
 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01;  Test statistics in parentheses 
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Table 5.2.  Regression Results for Hedonic Farmland Price Model with 
Differential Slope Variables, 2000-2010 
 
  
OLS 
(Pooled) 
 
OLS 
(Non-spatial 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial Lag 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial 
Error RE) 
 
ML  
(Spatial Lag 
Time FE) 
 
 
ln(SPR) 
 
0.270 
 
0.368 
 
0.422 
 
0.307 
 
0.224 
 (3.53)*** (3.11)*** (2.24)** (2.48)** (3.20)*** 
ln(POPDEN) 0.205 0.208 0.311 0.194 0.201 
 (12.30)*** (7.99)*** (7.15)*** (7.57)*** (13.25)*** 
ln(CHIDIST) -0.816 -0.831 -0.844 -0.853 -0.616 
 (21.71)*** (12.35)*** (8.01)*** (12.22)*** (14.02)*** 
ln(STLDIST) -0.318 -0.316 -0.320 -0.329 -0.244 
 (12.53)*** (7.36)*** (5.32)*** (7.22)*** (9.60)*** 
ln(SIZE) -0.154 -0.233 -0.362 -0.234 -0.179 
 (3.18)*** (5.44)*** (6.75)*** (6.04)*** (4.01)*** 
ln(INCOME) 0.211 -0.001 0.088 0.202 0.240 
 (2.42)** (0.01) (0.52) (1.58) (2.30)** 
ln(SPR2006-2010)  0.212 0.173 0.197 0.210 0.130 
 (1.87)* (1.95)* (1.74)* (2.15)** (1.26) 
ln(POPDEN2006-2010)  -0.077 -0.086 -0.123 -0.071 -0.074 
 (3.22)*** (4.60)*** (4.91)*** (4.06)*** (3.43)*** 
ln(CHIDIST2006-2010)  0.113 0.097 0.113 0.166 0.086 
 (2.32)** (2.53)** (2.02)** (3.80)*** (1.51) 
ln(STLDIST2006-2010) 0.029 0.017 0.020 0.050 0.019 
 (0.81) (0.61) (0.50) (1.47) (0.53) 
ln(SIZE2006-2010) 0.015 0.024 0.064 0.066 0.056 
 (0.21) (0.43) (0.81) (1.28) (0.87) 
ln(INCOME2006-2010) -0.131 -0.097 -0.038 -0.193 -0.062 
 (1.70)* (1.61) (1.44) (3.00)*** (0.42) 
Spatial coeff. (ρ)  0.340 0.380 0.244 
   (12.15)*** (12.36)*** (8.97)*** 
 
 
Pseudo R2 [corr(y,y)2]  0.7653  0.7630  0.8692  0.8688  0.7307 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Counties 98 98 98 98 98 
 
 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01;  Test statistics in parentheses 
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Figure 5.1.  Joint Influence of SPR and Chicago Distance on Illinois Farmland Prices, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Joint Influence of SPR and St. Louis Distance on Illinois Farmland Prices, 2010 
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Table 5.3.  Regression Results for Hedonic Farmland Price Model with Recreational  
Amenity Index and Differential Slope Variables, 2000-2010 
 
  
OLS 
(Pooled) 
 
OLS 
(Non-spatial 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial Lag 
RE) 
 
ML 
(Spatial 
Error RE) 
 
ML  
(Spatial Lag 
Time FE) 
 
 
ln(SPR) 
 
0.290 
 
0.389 
 
0.440 
 
0.328 
 
0.238 
 (3.73)*** (3.24)*** (2.21)** (2.61)** (3.33)*** 
ln(POPDEN) 0.201 0.205 0.307 0.191 0.198 
 (11.90)*** (7.80)*** (7.16)*** (7.39)*** (12.90)*** 
ln(CHIDIST) -0.828 -0.846 -0.853 -0.868 -0.626 
 (21.31)*** (12.28)*** (8.22)*** (12.11)*** (13.92)*** 
ln(STLDIST) -0.316 -0.314 -0.317 -0.327 -0.243 
 (12.43)*** (7.34)*** (5.31)*** (7.19)*** (9.56)*** 
ln(SIZE) -0.161 -0.234 -0.360 -0.235 -0.183 
 (3.31)*** (5.44)*** (6.91)*** (6.07)*** (4.09)*** 
ln(INCOME) 0.217 0.002 0.091 0.205 0.245 
 (2.49)** (0.02) (0.54) (1.60) (2.35)** 
ln(RECINDEX) 0.030 0.037 0.037 0.035 0.019 
 (1.31) (0.97) (0.62) (0.92) (0.90) 
ln(SPR2006-2010)  0.219 0.184 0.215 0.219 0.139 
 (1.90)* (2.02)** (1.81)* (2.21)** (1.32) 
ln(POPDEN2006-2010)  -0.078 -0.088 -0.124 -0.072 -0.075 
 (3.21)*** (4.60)*** (4.54)*** (4.08)*** (3.43)*** 
ln(CHIDIST2006-2010)  0.108 0.089 0.103 0.157 0.080 
 (2.10)** (2.20)** (1.73)* (3.42)*** (1.37) 
ln(STLDIST2006-2010) 0.029 0.017 0.019 0.048 0.019 
 (0.81) (0.62) (0.51) (1.41) (0.54) 
ln(SIZE2006-2010) 0.010 0.020 0.052 0.065 0.051 
 (0.15) (0.35) (0.73) (1.26) (0.79) 
ln(INCOME2006-2010) 0.217 0.002 0.091 0.205 0.245 
 (2.49)** (0.02) (0.54) (1.60) (2.35)** 
ln(RECINDEX2006-2010) 0.011 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.013 
 (0.30) (0.62) (0.59) (0.57) (0.39) 
Spatial coeff. (ρ)  0.339 0.380 0.241 
   (12.12)*** (12.36)*** (8.84)*** 
 
 
Pseudo R2 [corr(y,y)2]  0.7662  0.7638  0.8694  0.8688  0.7398 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
Counties 98 98 98 98 98 
 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01;  Test statistics in parentheses 
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Figure 5.3.  OLS Regression Coefficients for Parcel-Level  
Hedonic Farmland Price Model, 2001-2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.  Spatial Lag Regression Coefficients for Parcel-Level  
Hedonic Farmland Price Model, 2001-2010 
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CHAPTER 6    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study analyzes IDOR farmland transfer data from 1979 to 2010 to identify the 
determinants of recent Illinois farmland prices.  Empirical results indicate that population 
pressures exerted a major influence on farmland prices from 2000 to 2010.  Surging demand and 
prices in the transitional farmland market contributed to high prices for urban-influenced 
farmland.  Transitional farmland’s impact on the entire farmland market was strongest early in 
the 2000 to 2010 period.  High prices for transitional farmland have implications for both the 
quantity and quality of agricultural operations persisting in urban-influenced areas.  Results show 
that urban influence on farmland prices diminished from 2006 onward, a finding that agrees with 
general perceptions of the era and makes sense in the context of wider trends in the residential 
real estate market and macroeconomy.   
Parcel-level analysis from 2001 to 2010 confirms the usefulness of this study’s hedonic 
model and reveals that the premium for urban farmland did indeed diminish late in the period 
studied.  More importantly, parcel-level regressions establish a major connection between soil 
quality and sale price.  Among a sample of farmland sales that excludes both transitional and 
recreational transactions, soil productivity and tillability have the largest impacts on sale price.  
This finding agrees with common sense and previous literature.  A less critical, but still 
noteworthy, component of the 2000 to 2010 Illinois farmland market was high demand for 
recreational farmland.  Although it is difficult to identify an empirical linkage between 
recreational amenity attributes and high farmland prices, these results do not invalidate the host 
of sources vouching for strong recreational farmland prices during the study period.  Above all, 
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this analysis of the Illinois farmland market provides empirical evidence that delineates the 
major influences on farmland prices from 2000 to 2010. 
This study’s results largely meet expectations created by previous research on Illinois 
farmland prices.  Although Oltmans et al. (1988) and Huang et al. (2006) utilize different 
explanatory variables than this study and address different time periods, their basic insights are 
visible herein.  Variables representing agricultural productivity, urban influence, and parcel size 
behave as predicted by Oltmans et al.  Furthermore, like Huang et al., this study finds that soil 
productivity and Chicago distance are leading determinants of Illinois farmland prices.  
Noteworthy differences in coefficient estimates between the aforementioned works and this 
study are a product of temporal dynamics in the Illinois farmland market and do not imply a 
fundamental disagreement in results. 
The research questions and conclusions articulated in this study only skim the surface of 
farmland price research.  Although the IDOR data set can be usefully applied to aggregate 
studies such as the one presented here, its richness is fully realized through parcel-level analysis.  
As this study explains, identifying relevant county-level measures of agricultural productivity, 
population influence, and recreational value is difficult due to considerable intra-county 
variation.  Parcel-level regressions using ISPFMRA data demonstrate the benefits of data 
specificity.  Matching detailed locational information with individual IDOR transfer declarations 
would increase the sample size and precision of any farmland price analysis.  The rise of GIS 
technology makes this type of research much more feasible (Bastian et al., 2002).  
Parcel-level data would also be valuable for exploring urban-influenced farmland prices.  
Chicoine (1981) conducts research of this sort in Illinois, but the transitional farmland market he 
studies is considerably different from its modern counterpart.  One of this study’s main findings 
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regards the transitional farmland bubble that peaked midway through the 2000 to 2010 period.  A 
detailed analysis of urban-influenced farmland could reveal the characteristics of farmland that is 
converted most frequently or lucratively.  Moreover, such research could identify signals of a 
building or bursting transitional farmland bubble. 
This study could be extended by including government payments as an additional 
explanatory variable.  Numerous studies of farmland prices account for government payments 
and show that, as expected, they are important determinants of farmland prices (Barnard et al., 
1997; Taylor and Brester, 2005; Roe et al., 2003).  Nonetheless, the exact impact of payments 
may vary based on both payment type and recipient expectations concerning future payments 
(Goodwin et al., 2011).  IDOR data could be used to explore these topics in greater depth.  
Government payments were not included in this study due to the absence of appropriate county-
level government payment data.  If such data were located, it would be a tremendous addition to 
the model used in this study.  Echoing a familiar sentiment, analysis of government payments 
and farmland prices is ideally conducted at the parcel level.  All told, government payments are 
an intricate subject worthy of considerable future research. 
 The opportunities outlined above underscore the exciting possibilities surrounding 
farmland price research.  Farmland prices have continued rising in years beyond this study’s 
frame of inquiry.  In fact, current interest in farmland is exceptionally high in both popular and 
academic circles.  It appears that farmland prices will demand considerable attention into the 
foreseeable future.  The trends and empirical results discussed in this study are a sound 
foundation for analysis in the years to come. 
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